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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over formal administrative proceedings of the 
Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-613(7), 
§ 630-4-403(1), § 78A-4-103(2)(a), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
f Procedure. 
1. 
2. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
As a matter oflaw, did the Hearing Officer correctly rule that Public Employees' 
Health Program ("PEHP") properly paid life insurance proceeds according to Utah 
law and the PEHP Life Master Policy? 
As a matter of equity, should PEHP be required to pay life insurance benefits 
twice on the same policy when Ms. Welty and Mr. Lopez waited six years to bring 
a claim? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court has said, "We review the Board's application or interpretation of a 
statute as a question of law under the correction-of-error standard." Bhatia v. Ret. Bd., 
Long-Term Disability Program, 2013 UT App 103, ,r 5,302 P.3d 140 (quoting McLeod v. 
Ret. Bd., 2011 UT App 190, ,r 9,257 P.3d 1090). 
In addition, "Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic 
evidence are matters oflaw, and on such questions we accord [the Board's] interpretation 
no presumption of correctness." Gee v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 842 P.2d 919,920 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (citation omitted). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-609(2) (emphasis added): 
The most recent beneficiary designations signed by the 
member and filed with the office [PEHP], including 
electronic records, at the time of the member's death are 
binding in the payment of any benefits due under this title. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-610(1) (emphasis added): 
(a) Any benefits payable to a beneficiary shall be made in the 
name of and delivered to the beneficiary .... 
( d) The total of the payments made under this section shall 
fully discharge and release the office [PEHPJ from any 
further claims. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-20-105(1) (emphasis added): 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a mechanism 
for covered employers to provide covered individuals with 
group health, dental, medical, disability, life insurance, 
medicare supplement, conversion coverage, cafeteria, flex 
plan, and other programs requested by the state, its political 
subdivisions, or educational institutions in the most efficient 
and economical manner. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Utah Legislature enacted the Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act 
("Retirement Act" or "Act"), found in Title 49 of the Utah Code, in order to provide a 
comprehensive system of retirement and health insurance benefits to state and local 
public employees throughout the State of Utah. In order to administer the benefit 
programs in a consistent and uniform way, the Legislature created within the Retirement 
2 
Act an administrative office-the Utah State Retirement Office, also known as the Utah 
Retirement Systems (the "Retirement Office" or "URS"), and a governing body-the 
Utah State Retirement Board ("Board"). See Utah Code Ann.§§ 49-11-201, -202. 
In addition, Chapter 11 of the Act provides general provisions which govern all 
systems, plans and programs administered by the Retirement Office. Sections 49-11-609 
and -610 specifically govern the distribution of payments to beneficiaries. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 49-11-10 I et seq. Chapter 20 of the Act, known as the Public Employees' Benefit 
and Insurance Program Act, creates a program allowing self-insured insurance benefits 
for public employees. See id. § 49-20-101, -103, -105, and-401(l)(a). The Public 
Employees' Benefit and Insurance Program, known as the Public Employees' Health 
Program ("PEHP"), a program within the Utah State Retirement Office, administers these 
statutory insurance benefits. See id. § 49-20-103. The statute provides, "The purpose of 
i) this chapter is to provide a mechanism for covered employers to provide covered 
individuals with group health, dental, medical, disability, life insurance, medicare 
supplement, conversion coverage, cafeteria, flex plan, and other programs requested by 
the state, its political subdivisions, or educational institutions in the most efficient and 
economical manner." Id.§ 49-20-105(1) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this statutory 
authority, the PEHP Group Term Life Program (referred to herein as "PEHP") 
administers the life insurance benefits that are the subject of this dispute. See id. § 49-20-
103. 
Appellant Diane Welty ("Ms. Welty") is the ex-wife of Jesse Gavino Lopez ("Mr. 
Lopez"), and Appellant Jacob Lopez ("Jacob") is the son of Mr. Lopez (Ms. Welty and 
3 
Jacob collectively referred to as "the Weltys"). R. 108-09. Mr. Lopez was employed by 
Salt Lake City Corporation ("City") and was covered by a group term life insurance 
policy offered to City employees through PEHP at the time of his death on July 9, 2006. 
R. 108. 
On the date of his death, July 9, 2006, Mr. Lopez was still an active employee of 
the City and had life insurance coverage with PEHP in the amount of $173,000.00. R. 
177. On July 26, 2006, PEHP received a Claimant's Statement from Mr. Lopez's 
designated beneficiary, Mary Ellen Lopez, his wife. R. 197. At that time, PEHP 
received no other claims to Mr. Lopez's life insurance proceeds. R. 243-45. On or about 
August 2, 2006, PEHP issued a check in the amount of $173,000.00 to Mary Ellen Lopez, 
the beneficiary designated on the Group Term Life/Accident Plan Beneficiary Change 
Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about March 13, 2006 ("2006 Beneficiary Change 
Form"). R. 243-44. 
It was not until nearly six years later, on or about May 1, 2012, that PEHP 
received notice that a claim was being made by the Weltys for Mr. Lopez's life insurance 
proceeds, by virtue of a summons and complaint to PEHP in Third District Court to 
recover the claimed life insurance proceeds. R. 246. In addition to PEHP and URS, the 
complaint also named as a defendant Mary Ellen Lopez, the named beneficiary who 
received the proceeds at the time of Mr. Lopez's death. Id. On September 19, 2012, the 
action brought in Third District Court was dismissed as to PEHP and URS because the 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against PEHP and URS. Id. 
Upon information and belief, the action was later dismissed as against Mary Ellen Lopez. 
4 
See Case History, Welty v. Lopez, Case No. 120902041, dated Dec. 8, 2014, attached 
(i) hereto as Appellee' s Addendum F. 
Not until August 28, 2012, did the Weltys submit a Notice of Claim to PEHP for 
the death of Mr. Lopez. R. 245. On December 4, 2012, the PEHP Life Claims Review 
Committee sent a letter denying the claim because PEHP properly paid the life insurance 
proceeds to the beneficiary listed at the time of Mr. Lopez's death. R. 214-15. On 
February 8, 2013, the Weltys appealed to the Executive Director of URS and requested 
that he reconsider the decision made by the PEHP Life Claims Review Committee. R. 
217-19. On February 28, 2013, the URS Executive Director sent a letter denying 
Appellants' appeal because he determined that PEHP had correctly paid the benefits to 
the named beneficiary at the time of death under the terms of the PEHP Group Term Life 
& Group Accident Master Policy ("PEHP Life Master Policy'' or "Master Policy"). R. 
@ 221-22. 
The Weltys filed a Request for Board Action to appeal the Executive Director's 
decision on or about April 4, 2013. R. 28. They later amended the Request. R. 102-03. 
Ultimately, the Board's Adjudicative Hearing Officer heard the matter on July 16, 2015, 
and ruled in favor of PEHP. R. 239, 289-98. The Board subsequently adopted the 
Hearing Officer's ruling. R. 297. 
The Weltys thereafter appealed the Board's final action to this Court. 
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SUMMARY OF THE FACTS 
Statement of Stipulated Facts lij 
The Parties stipulated to the following facts in writing before the Board: 
1. Jesse Gavino Lopez ("Mr. Lopez") was employed by Salt 
Lake City Corporation ("City") and was covered by a group @) 
term life insurance policy offered to City employees through 
the Public Employees' Health Program ("PEHP") Life 
Program. 
2. Mr. Lopez, and petitioner, Diane Welty ("Ms. Welty") were @ 
married in August 1978 and divorced in October 1997. 
3. On October 29, 1997, a Decree of Divorce was ordered by 
Judge Pat B. Brian of the 3rd District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
@ 
4. In the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Lopez was ordered as follows: 
24. That the Respondent currently has in force and effect a 
life insurance policy on his life in the face amount of 
$325,000.00. That Respondent is ordered to maintain in full ~ 
force and effect said life insurance policy until such time as 
the last of the parties' children reaches age 18 or alimony 
terminates, whichever is later. During the period that the 
child support is due, the Respondent should be ordered to 
irrevocably designate the Petitioner, as trustee for the minor 
~ children, beneficiary on said life insurance policy. The 
Respondent should be ordered to provide the Petitioner with 
proof that the insurance is in effect within 30 days of entry of 
the Divorce Decree and providing verification that said 
insurance is in effect by January 15th of each year thereafter. 
@ 
5. In July 1999, Mr. Lopez had coverage of $173,000.00 with 
the Life Program, of which $50,000.00 was funded by the 
City and the rest funded by Mr. Lopez. 
6. On December 3, 1999, PEHP received a Group Term Life 
Application from Mr. Lopez dated on or about November 29, @ 
1999. The application indicated that Mr. Lopez was applying 
6 
@ 
@) 
@ 
7. 
for $300,000.00 in Basic Group Term Life Coverage. The 
application named Diane (petitioner) for minor children as 
per attached divorce decree and Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as 
secondary beneficiary. Mr. Lopez's request for additional 
coverage was cancelled in December 1999 based upon 
contact from the City's Human Resources Department. 
On December 3, 1999 the Life Program received a 
Beneficiary Change Form signed by Mr. Lopez on November 
29, 1999, which listed Petitioner, "Diane (petitioner) for 
minor children as per attached divorce decree" as primary 
beneficiary and Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as secondary 
beneficiary. 
8. The Life Program received a written copy of the Decree of 
Divorce entered by the Third District of the State of Utah on 
October 29, 1997 attached to the Beneficiary Change Form 
submitted by Mr. Lopez on or about December 3, 1999. 
9. In a Verified Response to Petitioner's Order to Show Cause 
signed by Mr. Lopez on December 6, 1999, Mr. Lopez 
provided. the following: 
a. On or about the 3 1st day of October, 1997 this Court 
entered a Decree of Divorce based upon the entry of 
Respondent's default. 
b. The Decree of Divorce contained a number of 
misstatements of fact, some even inconsistent with the 
terms of the Petition from which the default was taken. 
Respondent was not provided with a copy of the Decree of 
C. 
d. 
Divorce until long after the time to set the default had 
expired under Rule 60(b ), U.R.C.P. 
In reality Respondent never had a life insurance policy on 
his life with a face amount of $325,000.00. 
At the time of divorce Respondent owned two policies. 
The first was a basic term policy offered through his 
employment for approximately $100,000. The second was 
a universal life insurance policy offered through Allstate 
Insurance which insured his life for only $50,000.00, and 
which also insured the life of Petitioner for $50,000.00. 
Thus, Respondent's factual burden to carry insurance has 
always been approximately $150,000.00. 
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10. On July 24, 2003, the Life Program received an Additional Group 
Term Life Employee Enrollment Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or 
about July 15, 2003. Mr. Lopez applied for additional coverage up @ 
to $300,000. The designated primary beneficiary was Petitioner 
Diane Lopez, his ex-wife[,] for minor child $300,000 per divorce 
decree and his son Petitioner Jacob Lopez as contingent beneficiary. 
This beneficiary change form also reflects Jacob Lopez's date of 
birth as August 27, 1988. However, Mr. Lopez did not complete 
@) 
underwriting requirements, and he was never issued the additional 
coverage. 
11. In addition to the Additional Group Term Life Employee Enrollment 
Form on July 24, 2003, PEHP received a Beneficiary Change Form 
signed on or about July 15, 2003, by Mr. Lopez. The form revoked Ci 
any previous nominations of beneficiary(ies) and designated Mary 
Ellen Lopez his wife and his ex-wife Diane Lopez petitioner for 
minor child as primary beneficiaries. 
12. On October 24, 2003, PEHP received a Group Term Life Change ~ Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about October 21, 2003. The form 
stated in relevant part: "Revoking any previous nomination or 
beneficiary(ies ), I hereby designate the following individuals to 
receive all benefits payable upon my death." Mr. Lopez designated 
Mary Ellen Lopez, his wife, as primary beneficiary and Joshua G. 
Lopez, his son, as contingent beneficiary. @ 
13. On March 20, 2006, PEHP received a Group Term Life/ Accident 
Plan Beneficiary Change Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about 
March 13, 2006. The form stated in relevant part: "Revoking any 
previous nomination or beneficiary(ies ), I hereby designate the @ 
following individuals to receive all benefits payable upon my death." 
Mr. Lopez designated Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as primary 
beneficiary. 
14. Mr. Lopez died on July 9, 2006. Qi 
15. Jacob Lopez was 17 years old at the time of Mr. Lopez's death. 
16. On July 26, 2006, PEHP received a Group Term Life Program 
Claimant's Statement from Mary Ellen Lopez. 
17. On or about August 2, 2006, PEHP issued a check in the amount of ® 
$173,000.00 to Mary Ellen Lopez, the beneficiary designated on the 
8 
@ 
Group Term Life/Accident Plan Beneficiary Change Form signed by 
Mr. Lopez on or about March 13, 2006. 
18. The Life Program Group Term Life Master Policy ("Master Policy") 
is the contract between the Life Program and its covered members. 
19. The Master Policy states: 
® PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
If a Subscriber and/or Dependent dies, the Plan will pay to the 
beneficiary, subject to the provisions set forth herein, the 
amount of coverage for which the Subscriber and/or 
Dependent is covered. 
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary. . . . Any 
payment made in good faith pursuant to this provision fully 
discharges the Plan to the extent of the payment. 
BENEFICIARY 
A subscriber shall designate a primary beneficiary and a 
contingent beneficiary at the time of application for coverage. 
A subscriber may change his or her beneficiary(ies) by filing 
a written notice of the change with the Plan. The change will 
take effect as [ of] the date the Subscriber signed the notice of 
change .... Any payment made by the Plan in good faith 
pursuant to this provision shall fully discharge the Plan to the 
extent of such payment. 
MODIFICATION 
No change in this Master Policy shall be valid unless 
approved by the Plan and unless such approval is evidenced 
by endorsement or amendment to this Master Policy. No 
agent has authority to change this Master Policy or waive any 
of its provisions. 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
A written notice of claim must be given to the Plan within 
(20) days after the death of a Subscriber and/or Dependent 
9 
unless it was not reasonably possible to do so. Notice given 
by or on behalf of a Subscriber and/or Dependent or his 
beneficiary if any, to the Plan at its office in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, with information sufficient to identify the Subscriber 
and/or Dependent, shall be deemed notice to the Plan. 
TIME OF PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
Benefits payable hereunder will be paid as soon as reasonably 
possible after receipts of an acceptable written proof of loss 
together with all supporting materials .... 
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary. If any 
payment remains unpaid at the death of the beneficiary, or if 
the beneficiary is a minor or is, in the opinion of the Plan, 
legally incapable of giving a valid receipt and discharge for 
any payment, the Plan, at its option, may pay such benefit to 
any relative or relatives by blood or connection by marriage 
of the Subscriber and/or Dependent who is deemed by the 
Plan to be equitably and legally entitled to receive the 
payment. Any payment made in good faith pursuant to this 
provision fully discharges the Plan to the extent of the 
payment. ... 
LEGAL ACTION 
No legal action may be brought against the Plan for unpaid 
benefits until at least sixty (60) days after written proof of 
loss has been furnished in accordance with the requirements 
stated above. No legal action may be brought after the 
expiration of three years after the time written proof of loss is 
required to be furnished. 
ENTIRE CONTRACT 
This Master Policy, any modifications to it, and the written 
statements, if any, of Subscribers, constitute the entire 
contract. 
20. On August 28, 2012, Petitioner, Ms. Welty submitted a notice 
of claim to the Life Program in which she presented a dispute 
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@ 
regarding the distribution of Mr. Lopez's life insurance 
coverage. 
(i) 
21. Ms. Welty indicated that Mr. Lopez had a life insurance 
policy with Allstate Life Insurance in the amount of 
$300,000.00 on or about October 29, 1997. 
22. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-618, "All data in the 
@ possession of the office is confidential, and may not be 
divulged by the office except as permitted by board action." 
Petitioners were not, and could not be, supplied with 
beneficiary designation information until they brought this 
request for board action. 
W) 
23. On or about May 1, 2012, Diane Welty and Jacob Lopez 
served a summons and complaint to Utah Retirement Services 
and PEHP in Third District Court to recover life insurance 
proceeds paid by PEHP through the Group Term Life Plan to 
@) Mary Ellen Lopez the designated beneficiary of Mr. Lopez. 
Mary Ellen Lopez was also named as a Defendant in this 
action. 
24. On September 19, 2012, the action brought in Third District 
Court against PEHP was dismissed without adjudication 
ti@ because the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
claims against PEHP. In a Declaration submitted in the Third 
District Court, Petitioner, Ms. Welty indicated the following: 
"1. Shortly after the death ofmy ex-husband, Mr. Lopez, I 
contacted Mrs. Lopez regarding the life insurance proceeds 
(j for my minor son, Jacob Lopez. 2. Mrs. Lopez told me that 
she had discussed the issue with her attorney, and that she did 
not have to pay any money to Jacob, but merely had to list 
Jacob on the title to her condo." 
25. Petitioners filed an Amended Request for Board Action on 
® April 5, 2013. 
26. On September 3, 2013, Respondents waived all arguments 
relating to barring claims pursuant to an applicable statute of 
limitations. 
@ 
R. 240-48. 
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Clarifications to Appellants' Statement of Additional Facts 
Appellants' Fact #1: Petitioners had power to determine that a submitted change @ 
of beneficiary form is invalid. Appellants' Br., at 17. 
Board's Response: First, PEHP specifically rejects any notion that Petitioners the 
Weltys had power to determine a change of beneficiary form is invalid. However, even 
presuming the Weltys meant "Respondent" PEHP instead of "Petitioners," by law and 
contract, PEHP was bound to pay the last properly designated beneficiary. As a matter of 
practice, if the beneficiary form was unclear as to the insured's intent based on the form, 
such as if beneficiary designation was not signed by the insured, PEHP may ask for 
further clarification as to intended beneficiary. R. 299, HT, at 28:3-12; 30:4-8. However, 0 
PEHP does not have the authority under law to completely disregard a facially valid 
beneficiary designation form. See Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-609. 
Appellants' Fact #2: Jacob Lopez has taken out student loans to fund his college 
education. Appellants' Br., at 17. 
Board's Response: PEHP does not have sufficient information to either confirm 
or deny this assertion, but for purposes of this appeal does not dispute it. Nothing in the 
record indicates that Jacob Lopez relied in any way on the PEHP life insurance in 
obtaining student loans. 
Appellants' Fact #3: Ms. Welty filed a motion for an order to show cause against 
Mr. Lopez related to the requirement that he carry life insurance and irrevocably 
designate Ms. Welty as a beneficiary. 
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Board's Response: PEHP was not a party to this action, but for purposes of this 
(i; appeal does not dispute this fact. 
Statement of Additional Relevant Facts 
1. The Weltys were aware of Mr. Lopez's passing at or near the time of his death. 
R. 300, Respt. 's Hr' g Ex. M, iJiJ 1-2. 
2. The Weltys were aware at or near the time of Mr. Lopez's death of his 
obligation under the October 29, 1997 decree of divorce ("Divorce Decree") to 
maintain life insurance coverage on behalf of Jacob. Id. 
3. The Weltys were aware at or near the time of Mr. Lopez's death that the 
Divorce Decree discussed an obligation to maintain Ms. Welty as the 
beneficiary of his life insurance. Id.; see also R. 123, 125-35. 
4. Ms. Welty spoke to Ms. Mary Ellen Lopez just after Mr. Lopez's death about 
her belief that the Mr. Lopez's PEHP life insurance benefits ought to be paid to 
Jacob. Upon information and belief, Mrs. Mary Ellen Lopez told Ms. Welty 
that instead of paying the benefits, she would list Jacob on the title to Mr. 
Lopez's condo. R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. M, ifil 1-2. 
5. The Weltys failed to file a claim with PEHP for Mr. Lopez's life insurance 
benefits until roughly six years after Mr. Lopez's death. R. 245. 
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I. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE HEARING OFFICER CORRECTLY 
RULED THAT PEHP PROPERLY PAID LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS 
OF JESSE LOPEZ TO HIS LAST NAMED BENEFICIARY IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH LAW AND THE PEHP MASTER POLICY. 
The Court should affirm the Hearing Officer's ruling that PEHP correctly paid life 
insurance benefits to the last named beneficiary of Mr. Lopez-Ms. Mary Ellen Lopez-
as a matter of law. Both Utah law and the PEHP Life Master Policy require that PEHP 
pay the last named beneficiary. 
PEHP is created and governed by Utah Code Title 49, the Utah Retirement Act. 
Section 49-11-609(2) requires, "[T]he most recent beneficiary designations signed by the 
member and filed with the office ... are binding in the payment of any benefits due 
under this title." Section 49-l 1-610(1)(d) then absolves PEHP, upon payment, from any 
additional claim related to paying these benefits in stating, "The total of the payments 
made [to a beneficiary] under this section shall fully discharge and release [PEHP] from 
any further claims." Thus, under Utah law, PEHP was fully discharged and released 
from any claims by the Weltys when it paid the life insurance benefits to the last named 
beneficiary of Mr. Lopez. 
The plain language of the PEHP Life Master Policy, which is the contract between 
Mr. Lopez and PEHP, as originally written, also requires that PEHP pay the last named 
beneficiary and absolves PEHP of further liability once it has done so. The Master Policy 
requires that PEHP "will pay to the beneficiary, subject to the provisions set forth herein, 
the amount of coverage for which the Subscriber ... is covered." R. 300, Respt. 's Hr'g 
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Ex. L, at 10. The provisions of the Master Policy allow Mr. Lopez to change his 
@ beneficiary at any time. Section V states, "A subscriber may change his or her 
beneficiary(ies) by filing a written notice of the change with the Plan." Id. Section V 
concludes by providing, "Any payment made by the Plan in good faith pursuant to this 
provision shall fully discharge the Plan to the extent of such payment. ... " Id. 
Thus, under applicable law and the contract, as written, PEHP properly allowed 
Mr. Lopez to modify his beneficiaries in accordance with the policy language, and PEHP 
must be discharged for the good faith payment it made to the last named beneficiary after 
Mr. Lopez's death. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE PEHP 
MASTER POLICY AS WRITTEN BECAUSE MR. LOPEZ FAILED TO 
INCORPORATE THE DIVORCE DECREE INTO THE POLICY, AND 
THE DIVORCE DECREE DID NOT APPLY TO PEHP. 
This Court should apply the plain language of Title 49 and the PEHP Life Master 
Policy to this matter and not incorporate the Divorce Decree between Ms. Welty and Mr. 
Lopez into the contract. In this case, Mr. Lopez did not specifically incorporate his 
i> Divorce Decree into the Master Policy. Although Mr. Lopez filed a change of 
beneficiary form in 2003 naming "Diane for minor children as per attached divorce 
decree," this was not specific enough to incorporate the Divorce Decree into the policy -
particularly when the document never mentions incorporation or any applicability to 
PEHP. Additionally, PEHP never consented to incorporation of the Divorce Decree, 
which is a prerequisite for it to be incorporated by reference. 
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Yet, even if this Court were to hold that the Divorce Decree was incorporated by 
reference into the PEHP Life Master Policy, the plain language of the Divorce Decree 
only ordered Mr. Lopez to take certain actions, not PEHP. Section 24 of the Divorce 
Decree, the only section that relates to life insurance, states, 
... That Respondent [Mr. Lopez] currently has in force and 
effect a life insurance policy on his life in the amount of 
$325,000.00. That Respondent [Mr. Lopez] is ordered to 
maintain in full force and effect said life insurance policy 
until such time as the last of the parties' children reaches age 
18 or alimony terminates, whichever is later. During the 
period that the child support is due, the Respondent [Mr. 
Lopez] should be ordered to irrevocably designate the 
Petitioner [Ms. Welty], as trustee for the minor children, 
beneficiary on said life insurance policy .... 
R. 123, ,r 24; R. 241, ,r 4. Nowhere in the language of the Divorce Decree is PEHP 
named in any way or required to take any action. R. 116-24. As such, this Court cannot 
impose new duties on PEHP today. 
In the alternative, even if this Court were to hold that the Divorce Decree was 
incorporated by reference into the PEHP Master Policy, and that the terms of the Divorce 
Decree apply to PEHP, this would merely create an ambiguity in the Policy. The PEHP 
Life Master Policy clearly allows for an insured to modify beneficiary designations at 
will. R. 210. This is contrary to the Divorce Decree, which the Weltys argue required 
Mr. Lopez to create an irrevocable beneficiary. R. 123. Such an ambiguity must be 
resolved through the Court's contract construction rules by looking to the intent of the 
parties. The language of the policy, beneficiary change forms, and actions of Mr. Lopez 
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and PEHP in submitting and accepting beneficiary change forms clearly show that neither 
~ party intended to create an irrevocable beneficiary. 
III. AS A MATTER OF EQUITY, PEHP SHOULD NOT BE HELD 
RESPONSIBLE TO PAY BENEFITS TWICE, PARTICULARLY WHEN 
THE WELTYS WAITED SIX YEARS TO BRING A CLAIM FOR MR. 
LOPEZ'S LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS. 
Although this case can and should be determined as a matter of law on the 
arguments above, even if this Court were to review equitable claims and arguments, 
PEHP must still prevail. As a matter of equity, absent bad faith, a life insurer like PEHP 
is only required to pay on a policy once. See, e.g., Crosby v. Crosby, 986 F.2d 79, 83 
( 4th Cir. 1993) ("[A]n insurer is discharged from all subsequent liability when it makes 
good faith payments to a purported beneficiary without notice of any competing 
claims."). The Weltys never made a claim and point to nothing in their brief which 
contradicts that PEHP made payment to Mr. Lopez's last named beneficiary in good 
faith. As such, even if PEHP had made a mistaken payment and Ms. Welty is adjudged 
to have been the proper beneficiary, PEHP is absolved from any claim that it has to pay 
ti) Mr. Lopez's life insurance benefit to Ms. Welty under general common law, and Ms. 
Welty's remedy is against the party who received the payment. 
The Utah common law, while allowing beneficiaries to be adjudicated under a 
divorce decree, has never held that divorce decrees apply to non-party insurers. The 
Weltys did not point to one case, and Appellees cannot find one, absent bad faith, that 
found divorce decrees binding on the life insurer itself or requiring a life insurance 
company to pay proceeds more than once to competing beneficiaries. 
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Further, equity clearly favors PEHP in this matter due to the Weltys' nearly six-
year delay in bringing a claim for life insurance benefits. Mr. Lopez died on July 9, ® 
2006. R. 243, 114. The very first contact the Weltys made with PEHP after Mr. Lopez's 
death was not until May 1, 2012. See id. 120. This delay prevented PEHP from timely 
investigating the Weltys' claims prior to payment. Thus, because of their failure to bring 
a timely claim, the Weltys' equitable claims fail according to the principles embodied in 
the common law doctrine of laches. PEHP would be injured due to the Weltys' lack of 
diligence if it has to pay the benefit twice when it only received premium for one life 
insurance benefit. 
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I. 
ARGUMENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE HEARING OFFICER CORRECTLY 
RULED THAT PEHP PROPERLY PAID THE LIFE INSURANCE 
PROCEEDS OF JESSE LOPEZ TO HIS LAST NAMED BENEFICIARY IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH UTAH LAW AND THE PEHP MASTER POLICY. 
This Court should affirm the Hearing Officer's ruling that PEHP correctly paid life 
insurance benefits to the last named beneficiary of Mr. Lopez following his death. No 
dispute exists between the parties that Mr. Lopez maintained life insurance coverage with 
~ PEHP through his employment with Salt Lake City Corporation. See R. 240, if 1. Upon 
Mr. Lopez's death, PEHP paid the life insurance benefit of $173,000 to his last named 
beneficiary, Ms. Mary Ellen Lopez, in accordance with the PEHP Life Master Policy and 
Utah law. R. 243-44, at if 17. The only dispute is whether PEHP correctly paid the last 
named beneficiary under the Master Policy and Utah law or should have waited almost 
six years for a challenge by the Weltys before paying out the claim. 
A. Utah Law Requires PEHP to Pay the Last Named Beneficiary. 
The Hearing Officer correctly ruled that PEHP was required by both Utah statute 
and contract to pay life insurance benefits to the last named beneficiary of an insured. 
URS and PEHP are governed by Utah Code Title 49, the Utah State Retirement Act. 
Chapter 20 of this Title is the specific chapter which creates and governs PEHP as a 
@ "program" of URS. However, Chapter 11 of Title 49 provides general information and 
definitions which govern all the systems, plans and programs administered by URS, 
including PEHP. 
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Utah Code section 49-11-609 states in relevant part in regards to URS/PEHP 
beneficiaries: 
( 1) As used in this section, "member" includes a ... covered 
individual .... 
(2) The most recent beneficiary designations signed by the 
member and filed with the office, including electronic 
records, at the time of the member's death are binding in the 
payment of any benefits due under this title. 
The term "covered individual" is defined in section 49-11-102( 17) as "any individual 
covered under Chapter 20, Public Employees' Benefit and Insurance Program Act." Mr. 
Lopez was a "covered individual" under Title 49 because he was covered by PEHP life 
insurance. Mr. Lopez's "most recent beneficiary designation[]" regarding his PEHP life 
insurance was his current wife, Mary Ellen Lopez. Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-609(2). 
Under statute, this beneficiary designation was thus "binding in the payment of any 
benefits due" from PEHP. Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-609(2). Therefore, PEHP correctly 
paid the life insurance benefit to Mr. Lopez's most recent named beneficiary. 
Because PEHP paid the benefit to the most recent named beneficiary, Utah law 
releases PEHP from any further claims for that paid benefit. Utah Code section 49-11-
610( 1 )( d) states, "The total of the payments made [ to a beneficiary] under this section 
shall fully discharge and release [PEHP] from any further claims." Thus, under Utah 
law, PEHP was fully discharged and released from any claims by the Weltys, or any 
other alleged beneficiary, when it paid the life insurance benefits to the last named 
beneficiary of Mr. Lopez. 
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Despite the clear language of these Utah statutes, the Weltys attempt to use Utah 
~ common law I to claim PEHP must pay life insurance benefits pursuant to the 
beneficiaries listed in a Divorce Decree to which PEHP was not a party. See Appellants' 
Br., at 20-21, 28-29 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484 (Utah 1975)). "Of 
course, where a conflict arises between the common law and a statute or constitutional 
law, the common law must yield." 2 Hansen v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 652 P.2d 1332, 1337-
38 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). As such, these Utah statutes override any legal or 
equitable common law claims made by the Weltys regarding how a benefit should be 
paid. 
As such, because Utah statutes governing PEHP apply, this Court must find that 
common law contract and equitable arguments take a back seat to the plain statutory 
language, which may not be disregarded. Thus, in any claim against PEHP, if PEHP 
® pays the last named beneficiary, it is released from any further liability as a matter of law 
by statute. See Utah Code Ann.§§ 49-11-609 and -610. 
4il 1 As discussed infra, the common law, like the statutes, also absolves a life insurance 
company from paying twice if it did so in good faith. See, e.g., Crosby v. Crosby, 986 
F .2d 79, 83 ( 4th Cir. 1993) ("[ A ]n insurer is discharged from all subsequent liability 
when it makes good faith payments to a purported beneficiary without notice of any 
competing claims."). Absent a competing claim by the Weltys, or notice from Mr. Lopez 
~ that he intended to maintain the Weltys as his designated beneficiaries, it cannot be said 
that PEHP had "notice of any competing claims." Id. 
2 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized this principle, finding that state common law yields 
to applicable federal statute. See, e.g., Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46 (1981) (ruling 
that benefit must be paid to last named beneficiary of life insurance, despite contrary 
divorce decree, because "controlling provisions of the [Serviceman's Group Life 
i Insurance Act] SGLIA prevail over and displace inconsistent state law," including 
equitable remedies such as a constructive trust); see also Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 
655 (1950); Hillman v. Maretta, --- U.S.----, 133 S. Ct. 1943 (2013). 
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B. The Plain Language of the PEHP Life Master Policy Requires PEHP to 
Pay the Last Named Beneficiary. 
The Utah statutes are dispositive of this issue. However, even if the Utah statutes 
do not apply, the PEHP Life Master Policy, as originally written, also forbids PEHP from 
paying anyone except the last designated beneficiary and allowed Mr. Lopez to change 
his beneficiary at any time. The PEHP Life Master Policy, the contract between Mr. 
Lopez and PEHP governing his life insurance benefits, states, "If a Subscriber and/or 
Dependent dies, the Plan will pay to the beneficiary, subject to the provisions set forth 
herein, the amount of coverage for which the Subscriber ... is covered." R. 210 
(emphasis added). Generally, an insured's right to change beneficiaries is governed by 
the terms of the insurance policy. See, e.g., State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 216 
S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. 2007). The PEHP Life Master Policy allows Mr. Lopez to change 
his beneficiary at any time. Section V of the Master Policy states, 
BENEFICIARY 
A Subscriber [insured employee] shall designate a primary 
beneficiary and a contingent beneficiary at the time of 
application for coverage. A Subscriber may change his or her 
beneficiary(ies) by filing a written notice of the change with 
the Plan .... Any payment made by the Plan in good faith 
pursuant to this provision shall fully discharge the Plan to the 
extent of such payment . ... 
R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. L, at 10 (emphasis added). The Master Policy plainly allows a 
Subscriber, such as Mr. Lopez, to change his beneficiary by filing a written notice of the 
change. The Utah Supreme Court has declared, 
The beneficiary of an insurance policy has merely an 
expectancy, contingent on the insured's death. The insured, if 
owner of the policy, during his lifetime, has a right to deal 
with his policy in any manner he desires. This includes the 
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right to change the beneficiary, or to cash in the policy or sell 
or assign his interest. 
Culbertson v. Cont'/ Assur. Co., 631 P .2d 906, 909-10 (Utah 1981 ). 
Furthermore, the PEHP Life Master Policy, like the applicable statute in Utah 
Code section 49-11-610, discharges PEHP of its liability for life insurance proceeds upon 
a payment made in good faith. See R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. L, at 10 ("Any payment 
made by the Plan in good faith pursuant to this provision shall fully discharge the Plan to 
i) the extent of such payment."). 
Thus, based on the plain language of the Master Policy, Mr. Lopez was able to 
change his beneficiary without permission from the beneficiary and at any time he chose, 
and PEHP was obligated to pay the last named beneficiary. In so doing, PEHP was 
accordingly discharged of any further liability. 
C. The Beneficiary Change Form Required PEHP to Pay the Last 
Named Beneficiary. 
In addition to the specific language in the Utah statutes and the PEHP Life Master 
Policy, the 1999 PEHP beneficiary change form submitted by Mr. Lopez, that the Weltys 
allege incorporates the Divorce Decree, specifically states that benefits will only be paid 
to "the most recent beneficiary." R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. C. In fact, the 1999 
beneficiary form states under the heading "Consideration when naming beneficiaries," 
that "Beneficiary payments are paid from the most recent beneficiary designation on file 
with PEHP." Id. (emphasis added). This statement makes no sense unless all beneficiary 
designations are revocable with PEHP under the plan. 
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Thus, when PEHP paid Mr. Lopez's last named beneficiary, it complied with 
Utah statutes, the contract governing the life insurance benefit as written, and the 
beneficiary form that declared beneficiary designations revocable. Thus, the Hearing 
Officer's ruling that PEHP paid the benefit to the correct party should not be disturbed. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD APPLY THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE 
MASTER POLICY AS WRITTEN BECAUSE MR. LOPEZ FAILED TO 
INCORPORATE THE DIVORCE DECREE INTO THE POLICY, AND 
THE DIVORCE DECREE DID NOT APPLY TO PEHP. 
This Court should apply the plain language of the statutes and the PEHP Life 
Master Policy as written, which require PEHP to pay the last designated beneficiary of 
Mr. Lopez. Despite this plain language, the Weltys try to muddy this issue by incorrectly 
attempting to incorporate the Divorce Decree into the PEHP Life Master Policy, 
something neither Mr. Lopez nor PEHP intended. But even if the Divorce Decree was 
incorporated into the PEHP Life Master Policy, PEHP must prevail as a matter of law 
under the Court's contractual construction rules. 
A. The Divorce Decree Was Not Incorporated by Reference into the 
PEHP Life Master Policy. 
As a matter of law, Mr. Lopez's 1999 change of beneficiary form failed to 
incorporate the Divorce Decree between Mr. Lopez and Ms. Welty into the life insurance 
contract by reference. Although documents may be incorporated into contracts by 
reference, Utah appellate courts have held individuals wishing to incorporate documents 
to a strict standard. The Utah Supreme Court has stated, 
Admittedly, parties may incorporate the terms of another 
document by reference into their contract. Yet, the terms of 
another document cannot be incorporated by reference 
without specific language. Rather, "the reference must be 
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clear and unequivocal," and alert the non-drafting party that 
terms from another document are being incorporated. 
Hous. Auth. of Cty. of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 28,, 19, 44 P.3d 724 (quoting 
Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268,273 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996)) (rejecting attempt to incorporate terms by reference when terms were not clear 
and unequivocal). This Court has restated the rule: 
In order "[fJor the terms of another document to be 
incorporated into the document executed by the parties, the 
reference must be clear and unequivocal, and must be called 
to the attention of the other party, [the party} must consent 
thereto, and the terms of the incorporated document must be 
known or easily available to the contracting parties; .... " 
Interwest Const. v. Palmer, 886 P .2d 92, 97 n. 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ( emphasis added) 
(quoting 17 A C.J.S. Contracts§ 299, at 136 (1963)). 
In this case, Mr. Lopez did not specifically incorporate his Divorce Decree from 
@ Ms. Welty into the PEHP Life Master Policy. On December 3, 1999, Mr. Lopez filed a 
change of beneficiary form with PEHP. R. 241-42,, 7; 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. B. Mr. 
Lopez stated on that form that he named as his beneficiary, "Diane for minor children as 
per attached divorce decree." Id. This statement did not provide a last name of Diane, 
nor name the minor children. Only by referring to the Divorce Decree could the 
beneficiaries be properly identified. Thus, while the Divorce Decree helped to name Mr. 
Lopez's beneficiary, on its face, it did not clearly or unequivocally incorporate the 
Divorce Decree into the contract, change or modify any terms of the PEHP Life Master 
Policy, or create an irrevocable beneficiary. Mr. Lopez's statement on the 1999 
beneficiary form is hardly the "specific," and "clear and unequivocal" language that is 
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required to incorporate a document by reference-particularly when the actual language 
never says that any document is being incorporated. See, e.g., Snyder, 2002 UT 28, 119; @ 
Palmer, 886 P.2d at 97 n. 8. 
Furthermore, PEHP (and likely Mr. Lopez) never consented to the incorporation 
of the Divorce Decree into the contract. The Utah Supreme Court has held as a 
requirement to incorporation, "Additionally, the party 'must consent thereto, and the 
terms of the incorporated document must be known or easily available to the contracting 
parties."' Peterson & Simpson v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2009 UT 54,115,217 P.3d 
716 ( finding that arbitration rules were agreed to and incorporated into agreement 
between parties) (quoting Consol. Realty Group, 930 P.2d at 273). Consent is more than 
the mere mention of the existence of a divorce decree. See, e.g., United Cal. Bank v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 681 P.2d 390, 419-20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) ("Mere reference 
to a document for descriptive purposes does not operate as an incorporation of the 
document into a contract." (Citations omitted.)). Instead, consent is a type of 
"acceptance" under contract law. "[A] response is an acceptance where the offeree 
manifests 'unconditional agreement to all of the terms of the offer.' The offeree must 
'manifest a definite intention to accept the offer and every part thereof ... without 
material reservations or conditions."' Cal Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. George, 865 
P.2d 1373, 1376 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), affd, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995), (quoting R.J. 
Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817, 819 (Utah 1952)). 
Nowhere can the Weltys point to where PEHP agreed or consented to all the 
Divorce Decree terms as part of the PEHP Life Master Policy. The Weltys misstate the 
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law when they claim that PEHP must be "bound by the incorporated decree even if they 
@ were unaware of what the decree stated, chose not to read the decree, or simply did not 
care to implement the decree." Appellant's Br., at 26-27. This only applies if PEHP had 
actually consented to the Divorce Decree, something the Weltys conveniently leave out 
of their analysis. Consent is of critical importance here because the Divorce Decree 
purports to modify the plain terms of the actual written contract. 
®} 
The Master Policy itself dictates how consent would be manifested, 
"MODIFICATION: No change in this Master Policy shall be valid unless approved by 
the Plan and unless such approval is evidenced by endorsement or amendment to this 
Master Policy .... " R. 210. Neither party to the Master Policy asserts that an 
endorsement or amendment was supplemented to the Master Policy. 
The Weltys cite to another provision of the Master Policy to contradict this 
Ci requirement, asserting that written statements of a subscriber can modify the contract 
without PEHP's express consent. The Master Policy states, "ENTIRE CONTRACT: 
This Master Policy, any modifications to it, and the written statements, if any, of 
Subscribers, constitute the entire contract." Id. Reading these provisions together, it is 
clear that to the extent that a Subscriber's written statement purports to change the terms 
of the Master Policy, for example, to strike the subscriber's right to change a beneficiary 
designation at any time and instead designate an irrevocable beneficiary, such a 
modification must be made with PEHP's approval, evidenced by a written endorsement 
or amendment. 
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Because PEHP did not consent to the Divorce Decree or its terms, and the 
reference to incorporation was not clear and unequivocal, the Divorce Decree was not 
incorporated into the contract under Utah law, and PEHP correctly paid the last 
designated beneficiary in accordance with the contract terms. 
B. In the Alternative, Even If the Divorce Decree Was Incorporated into 
the PEHP Life Master Policy, the Plain Language of the Divorce 
Decree Only Imposed Obligations on Mr. Lopez, and Not PEHP. 
Despite the plain language of Utah Code sections 49-11-609 and -610, which 
require PEHP to pay the last named beneficiary and absolve PEHP of further liability 
once it has paid benefits, and despite the plain language in the PEHP Life Master Policy 
that an employee can "change his or her beneficiary ... ," in the alternative, even if this 
Court were to hold that the Divorce Decree was incorporated by reference into the PEHP 
Life Master Policy, the plain language of the Divorce Decree only ordered Mr. Lopez to 
take certain actions, but did not order PEHP to take any action. Even the Weltys seem to 
admit that the Divorce Decree only applied to Mr. Lopez when they state in the stipulated 
facts, "In the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Lopez was ordered as follows: ... " R. 241, ,r 4 
( emphasis added). 
When enforcing the terms of an insurance contract, the Court looks to the plain 
language. "Well-accepted rules of contract interpretation require that we examine the 
language of a contract to determine meaning and intent. Where the language is 
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the 
contractual language .... " Glenn v. Reese, 2009 UT 80, ,r 10,225 P.3d 185 (citations 
omitted). 
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Therefore, assuming arguendo that the Divorce Decree became part of the 
€ij insurance contract, the plain language of the Divorce Decree only imposed duties on Mr. 
Lopez, and not on PEHP, a non-party.3 Section 24 of the Divorce Decree, the only 
section that relates to life insurance, states, 
24. That the Respondent [Mr. Lopez] currently has in force 
and effect a life insurance policy on his life in the amount of 
$325,000.00. That Respondent [Mr. Lopez] is ordered to 
maintain in full force and effect said life insurance policy 
until such time as the last of the parties' children reaches age 
18 or alimony terminates, whichever is later. During the 
period that the child support is due, the Respondent [Mr. 
Lopez] should be ordered to irrevocably designate the 
Petitioner [Ms. Welty], as trustee for the minor children, 
beneficiary on said life insurance policy. The Respondent 
[Mr. Lopez] should be ordered to provide the Petitioner [Ms. 
Welty] with proof that the insurance is in effect within 30 
days of entry of the Divorce Decree and providing 
verification that said insurance is in effect by January 15th of 
each year thereafter. 
R. 123, iJ 24; R. 241, iJ 4. Nowhere in the language of the Divorce Decree is PEHP 
named in any way or ordered to take any action. R. 116-24. This Court cannot now 
make up obligations for a non-party like PEHP nearly twenty years after the divorce. See 
id. The Weltys' remedy to enforce the Divorce Decree is similarly clear, they are to 
bring an order to show cause with the Court. 4 
3 PEHP did not and would not ignore a valid Court order that applied to it. In this case, 
PEHP did not ignore the Divorce Decree, it simply was not a party to the divorce 
proceedings and therefore was not ordered by the Court to take any action. 
4 Interestingly, Ms. Welty obviously knew how to enforce the Divorce Decree since she 
filed for an order to show cause in November 1999. See Appellants' Br., at 32 ("In 
November of 1999, Ms. Welty took the extraordinary step of paying the costs associated 
with moving the court for an order to show cause regarding violation of the decree of 
divorce."); R. 125. However, because Mr. Lopez was required provide verification of the 
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Furthermore, the Divorce Decree language was so factually deficient in regards to 
the life insurance Mr. Lopez maintained at the time of divorce, that it may not even apply Ci> 
to Mr. Lopez, let alone to PEHP. At the time of divorce, Mr. Lopez maintained 
$100,000, not $325,000, in life insurance with PEHP. R. 265, 19(d). Mr. Lopez 
admitted to the District Court in 1999 that he had at least one other life insurance policy, 
through Allstate Insurance, in addition to the PEHP coverage at the time of the divorce. 
Id. Because the Divorce Decree speaks in the singular regarding "a life insurance 
policy," it is unclear whether the requirement in the Divorce Decree was on Mr. Lopez to 
maintain the PEHP policy, the Allstate policy, or some other policy that PEHP may be 
unaware exists. R. 123. Such an ambiguity cannot be said to create a duty upon PEHP to 
maintain a beneficiary of a policy that was not named and cannot be reasonably inferred 
from the language. 
@ 
Additionally, the plain language of the Divorce Decree is unclear regarding what it @ 
actually ordered Mr. Lopez to do versus what Mr. Lopez "should be" ordered to do. The 
Divorce Decree never actually ordered Mr. Lopez to name a specific beneficiary, but 
only that he "should be ordered" to irrevocably designate Ms. Welty as beneficiary of the 
unnamed life insurance policy. 5 Absent some additional, more specific order from the 
Court, even Mr. Lopez was not specifically ordered to create an irrevocable beneficiary, 
let alone PEHP having such a duty as a non-party. Indeed, if the Divorce Decree purports 
life insurance policy annually, his failure to do so should have prompted Ms. Welty to 
take further action to enforce the Divorce Decree. 
5 Contrast that language with the specific language in the divorce decree where Mr. Lopez 
"is ordered to maintain ... said life insurance policy." R. 264, 14. 
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to create some legal duty upon PEHP, it may have been a due process violation for the 
~ Court to order a non-party to perform certain actions in a civil matter absent notice and 
the right to appear. See Dairy Product Servs. Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 2000 UT 81, ,r 49, 
13 P .3d 5 81 ("The minimum requirements [ of due process] are adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner."). 
Therefore, as a matter of law6 and on its face, the Divorce Decree did not require 
any action on the part of PEHP because PEHP was not a party and had no notice or 
opportunity to be heard in the divorce proceeding. 
C. In the Alternative, Even If the Divorce Decree Was Incorporated into 
the PEHP Life Master Policy, This Merely Created an Ambiguity in 
the Contract Which Must Be Resolved in Favor of PEHP. 
Despite the plain language of Utah Code section 49-11-609, which requires PEHP 
to pay the last named beneficiary, and section 49-11-610, which absolves PEHP from 
Ci further liability if it pays the last named beneficiary, and despite the plain language in the 
PEHP Life Master Policy that an employee can "change his or her beneficiary ... ," in 
the alternative, even if this Court were to hold that the Divorce Decree was incorporated 
by reference into the PEHP Life Master Policy, this merely creates an ambiguity in the 
Policy. Such an ambiguity must be resolved through the Court's contract construction 
6 The cases that require payment of life insurance proceeds to a divorced ex-spouse are 
awarded in equity, and not as a matter oflaw. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 531 
P.2d 484 (Utah 1975); Nielsen v. Nielsen, 535 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1975); Madsen v. Estate 
of Moffitt, 542 P.2d 187 (Utah 1975). The Weltys seem to conflate the two at times in 
their brief arguing both that the Divorce Decree was incorporated into the agreement, and 
that Utah law requires the payment of proceeds to Welty in equity under common law. 
See Appellants' Br., at 20-23. Regardless of whether Appellants make an argument in 
equity or law, it makes no difference to the outcome here since PEHP prevails under 
either theory. 
31 
rules by looking to the intent of the parties which clearly show that Mr. Lopez did not 
intend to create an irrevocable beneficiary wlth PEHP. 
Assuming arguendo that the Divorce Decree was incorporated into the PEHP Life 
Master Policy, this would result in a contract ambiguity. 
A contractual term or provision is ambiguous "if it is capable 
of more than one reasonable interpretation because of 
uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies." ... [C]ontractual ambiguity can occur in two 
different contexts: (1) facial ambiguity with regard to the 
language of the contract and (2) ambiguity with regard to the 
intent of the contracting parties. 
Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51,125, 190 P.3d 1269 (quoting WebBank v. Am. Gen. 
Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88,120, 54 P.3d 1139). 
Moreover, in evaluating ambiguity within the plain meaning 
of a contract, a court will attempt to harmonize all of the 
contract's provisions and all of its terms. If, however, a court 
cannot resolve the problem by harmonizing ambiguous or 
conflicting terms, as a matter of law, then the court may 
properly conclude there is an ambiguity. 
Lunceford v. Lunceford, 2006 UT App 266, 115, 139 P.3d 1073 (citations omitted). 
Incorporation of the Divorce Decree would result in two conflicting provisions: First, the 
PEHP Life Master Policy plainly states, "A Subscriber may change his or her 
beneficiary(ies) by filing a written notice of the change with the Plan." R. 300, Respt.'s 
Hr' g Ex. L, at I 0. And second, in contrast, the Divorce Decree states, "24 .... [Mr. 
Lopez] should be ordered to irrevocably designate [Ms. Welty], as trustee for the minor 
children, beneficiary on said life insurance policy .... " R. 240, 14. 
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This ambiguity would be resolved through the Court's contract construction rules 
@v by looking to the intent of the parties. "Insurance policies are contracts, and are 
interpreted under the same rules governing ordinary contracts." Gee v. Utah State Ret. 
Bd., 842 P .2d 919, 920 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ( citing Village Inn Apartments v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 790 P.2d 581,582 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated, "In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling." 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). "When interpreting a contract, 
'we look to the writing itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and we consider each 
contract provision ... in relation to all of the others, with a view toward giving effect to 
all and ignoring none." Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, iJ 17, 84 P.3d 
1134 (internal quotation omitted). 
Looking to the intent of the parties, it is clear that neither Mr. Lopez nor PEHP 
@ intended to create an irrevocable beneficiary at any time. PEHP's intent is perfectly clear 
from the plain language of the PEHP Life Master Policy. As stated supra, the actual 
Master Policy language without the claimed incorporated Divorce Decree plainly states 
that the subscriber/employee can change their beneficiary designation. 
This intent is further evidenced by the testimony of the PEHP Life and Accident 
Manager, Chris Lamkin ("Mr. Lamkin"), and the actions of PEHP. Mr. Lamkin testified 
at the hearing on cross examination: 
Q Could there be information - a box check [ on the PEHP 
beneficiary change form], so to speak, that made a beneficiary 
irrevocable? 
A No. We - our beneficiaries are always revocable. 
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R. 299, HT at 34:25-35:2. Further, PEHP always acted as if the named beneficiary was 
revocable. Specifically, PEHP never made any statement that the beneficiary designation 
by Mr. Lopez was irrevocable. And PEHP accepted additional beneficiary designations 
from Mr. Lopez after the 1999 beneficiary designation, and ultimately paid the last 
designated beneficiary. R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. F, and H. Appellants have nothing to 
show that PEHP intended to create an irrevocable beneficiary in Ms. Welty. 
Similarly, Mr. Lopez's actions also show that he did not intend to create an 
irrevocable beneficiary. Neither Ms. Welty, nor her son, Jacob, ever testified at the 
hearing that Mr. Lopez had made a statement to them that he had made the beneficiary 
designation with PEHP irrevocable. All Jacob testified to was that his father told him 
that he wanted him to go to college. R. 299, HT 17:1-10 ("[Mr. Lopez] always had a big 
desire for like all of us to finish school, and go to college, be successful. ... It's like he 
always wanted us to go to college .... ").7 This statement is wholly unrelated to the life 
insurance beneficiary designation. 
Because Mr. Lopez is deceased, there was no direct testimony from him as to 
whether he intended to create an irrevocable beneficiary. We only have his actions and 
the language of the contract. Given that Mr. Lopez changed his beneficiary after sending 
7 Of note, the Weltys' equitable argument that Jacob bore the burden of PEHP's error 
utterly fails. The Weltys never provided any evidence or made any argument that they 
relied in any way on the PEHP life insurance proceeds to their detriment. Indeed, under a 
theory of equitable estoppel they would have to show that the so le reason for Jacob 
incurring student loans was in reliance on being paid the life insurance proceeds from Mr. 
Lopez. See e.g., McLeod v. Ret. Bd., 2011 UT App 190, ,-r 21,257 PJd 1090 (ruling that @ 
member could not prevail against the Board on theory of equitable estoppel because he 
failed to prove a specific statement that was later repudiated). This they have not done. 
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the Divorce Decree to PEHP, it is clear that he did not believe that he had created an 
(wJ irrevocable beneficiary either. R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. F, and H. 
Because both PEHP and Mr. Lopez acted in accordance with Utah law and the 
PEHP Life Master Policy that a beneficiary could be changed at any time, any ambiguity 
in the contract must be interpreted to find that PEHP and Mr. Lopez intended all of Mr. 
Lopez's beneficiary designations to be revocable. 
III. AS A MATTER OF EQUITY, PEHP SHOULD NOT BE HELD 
~ RESPONSIBLE TO PAY BENEFITS TWICE, PARTICULARLY WHEN 
THE WELTYS WAITED SIX YEARS TO BRING A CLAIM FOR MR. 
LOPEZ'S LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS. 
The Hearing Officer's ruling should be affirmed as a matter of law under both the 
statute and PEHP Life Master Policy as discussed supra. However, even if this Court 
were to review equitable claims and arguments, PEHP must still prevail. As a matter of 
equity, absent bad faith, a life insurer like PEHP is only required to pay on a policy once. 
See, e.g., Crosby v. Crosby, 986 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1993) (" ... an insurer is discharged 
from all subsequent liability when it makes good faith payments to a purported 
@ beneficiary without notice of any competing claims."). In addition, if the Weltys' delay 
of roughly six years from the date of Mr. Lopez's death in bringing a claim causes PEHP 
to pay twice, that would substantially harm PEHP and would set a precedent that causes 
hardship upon legitimate beneficiaries who would have to wait for years before payment 
of life insurance benefits. 
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A. The Hearing Officer's Ruling that PEHP Correctly Paid the Benefits 
Must Be Upheld Because PEHP's Good Faith Payment of Life Insurance 
Benefits to Mr. Lopez's Last Named Beneficiary Discharges It from 
Further Liability. 
The common law across the country discharges and absolves insurers, such as 
PEHP, from any further liability for life insurance proceeds after making a payment in 
good faith to the last named beneficiary. Thus, the Hearing Officer correctly stated that 
PEHP properly paid these benefits to the last named beneficiary. R. 289-98. Both 
Federal and State Courts have held that there is a 
... widespread principle that an insurer is discharged from all 
subsequent liability when it makes good faith payments to a 
purported beneficiary without notice of any competing 
claims. Rogers v. Unionmutual Stock Life Insurance Co., 782 
F.2d 1214 (4th Cir.1986); Weed v. Equitable Life Assurance 
Society of U.S., 288 F.2d 463,464 (5th Cir.1961); Commire v. 
Automobile Club of Michigan Ins. Group, 454 N.W.2d 248, 
249 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990); Kelly Health Care Inc. v. 
Prudential Ins. Co. of America, Inc., 309 S.E.2d 305, 306 n. 1 
(Va. 1983); Harper v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 662 
P.2d 1264, 1273 (Kan. 1983); In re Estate of Thompson, 426 
N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 198 I). Such a rule minimizes the 
chances for imposing double liability for mistaken, but good 
faith payments to a purported beneficiary. 
Crosby, 986 F.2d at 83 (finding insurer acted reasonably in paying life insurance benefits 
to named beneficiary and absolving insurer from liability to ex-wife). The Weltys have 
never claimed that PEHP made payment to Mr. Lopez's last named beneficiary in 
anything but good faith. See R. 261-76; 299, HT 38:8-46:14; see also Appellant's Br., at 
20-38. Indeed, they cannot make such a claim for bad faith for the first time now.8 Also, 
8 
"Generally, 'in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the 
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."' 
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ,r 15, 164 P.3d 366 (quoting Brookside Mobile Home Park, 
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it is undisputed that at the time PEHP paid the claim to Ms. Mary Ellen Lopez, the 
@ Weltys had not made any claim on the life insurance proceeds with PEHP or given PEHP 
any notice of a disputed claim. R. 245. As such, under the widespread common law rule, 
even if PEHP had made a mistaken payment and Ms. Welty is adjudged to have been the 
proper beneficiary, having paid in good faith, PEHP is absolved from any further 
payment. 
The Utah Legislature has adopted a similar policy by statute in the Utah Insurance 
Code governing life insurance. Although as a self-insured, employer-sponsored life 
insurance program PEHP is not subject to the Utah Insurance Code,9 the Utah Insurance 
Code illustrates Utah's policy of protecting life insurance companies in paying benefits. 
As a policy matter, the principle in this provision can be applied to PEHP, particularly in 
regard to timely payment of claims. Utah Code section 31A-22-413(2)(a) states in 
Gt> relevant part," ... Notwithstanding section 75-2-804, 10 the insurer discharges its 
obligation under the insurance policy or certificate of insurance if it pays the properly 
designated beneficiary unless it has actual notice of either an assignment or a change in 
beneficiary designation .... " Utah law discharges these insurers because Utah also 
requires significant interest to be paid by a life insurance company that does not pay a 
Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, il 14, 48 P.3d 968). Further, the Weltys cannot now make a 
new claim of bad faith in a reply brief. Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(c) ("Reply 
briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief."). 
9 See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-103 (3 )( f), "Except as otherwise expressly provided, this 
title does not apply to ... self-insurance[.] ... " 
10 Utah Code section 75-2-804 creates a presumption, absent express terms to the 
contrary, revoking any revocable beneficiary designation to a former spouse at the time 
of divorce or annulment. 
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claim within 30 days from the date the insurer receives notice of the claim. See Utah 
Code Ann.§ 31A-22-428(3) (requiring insurers to pay 10% interest on top of regular 
interest to beneficiaries after 30 days from employer receiving notice of death and claim). 
Thus, as a policy matter, Utah encourages life insurers to review and resolve claims in a 
timely manner, and then discharges insurers who do so from having to pay twice. This 
policy also protects legitimate beneficiaries from having to wait perhaps years to receive 
life insurance proceeds to see if some unnamed beneficiary may challenge the life 
insurance claim. Such a delay in paying life insurance claims would create an undue 
hardship on the life insurance company to pay additional interest, and particularly on 
legitimate beneficiaries that are not able to access such life insurance proceeds. As such, 
as a policy matter, life insurers like PEHP should be encouraged to adjudicate and decide 
claims in a timely manner. 
In addition to such policy arguments, Courts in some cases have even refused to 
allow claimed beneficiaries to bring claims against insurers for double payment. For 
example, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals held, in Green v. Green, 
The cases are legion in which wives or children who were 
removed as beneficiaries of life insurance policies in violation 
of the terms of separation agreements or divorce judgments 
have been permitted to recover the proceeds of such policies 
either from the improperly substituted beneficiaries or, where 
the proceeds had not been paid out, from the insurers. 
Green v. Green, 433 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) ( emphasis added) ( citations 
omitted) ( awarding children of first marriage life insurance proceeds from widow after 
life insurer had paid last named beneficiary widow). Thus, only when the proceeds had 
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not already been paid out could a person seek a remedy from the insurer in equity. See 
id. 
Rather than a remedy from PEHP, the Weltys' remedy is in equity against Mary 
Ellen Lopez, the last named beneficiary to whom PEHP paid the proceeds, or from the 
estate of Mr. Lopez, who was the one purported to be in contempt of the Divorce Decree. 
In fact, the Weltys have already brought suit against Mary Ellen Lopez in Utah District 
Court to recover the proceeds, but the claim appears to have been dismissed. See Case 
History, Welty v. Lopez, Case No. 120902041, dated Dec. 8, 2014, attached hereto as 
Appellee's Addendum F. Nevertheless, because PEHP had already paid out the proceeds 
of the insurance policy when the Weltys first made a claim against PEHP roughly six 
years following Mr. Lopez's death, PEHP cannot equitably be held responsible to pay out 
additional proceeds. 
B. Utah Common Law Related to Life Insurance Under a Divorce Decree 
Only Adjudicates Between Competing Beneficiaries and Not Between an 
Insurer and a Potential Beneficiary. 
Rather than a remedy from PEHP, the Weltys' remedy is in equity against Mary 
Ellen Lopez, the last named beneficiary to whom PEHP paid the proceeds, or from the 
estate of Mr. Lopez, who was the one purported to be in contempt of the Divorce Decree. 
Utah follows the general common law rule that a divorce decree can direct the 
distribution of life insurance proceeds between competing beneficiaries. Travelers Ins. 
Co. v. Lewis, 531 P.2d 484 (Utah 1975). However, the Weltys' attempt to extend the 
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Utah common law cases far beyond their actual holdings I I and to impose duties on PEHP 
or other insurers through divorce decrees even though they were non-parties to the 
divorce proceeding should be rejected by this Court. 
In Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lewis, Travelers Insurance Company brought an 
interpleader action between competing beneficiaries, the children of the deceased from 
his first marriage, and the current widow. The Court held that in equity (not in law), a 
divorce decree "should control the disposition of an insurance policy between contending 
beneficiaries." 531 P .2d at 485-86 ( emphasis added). The Court then awarded the 
proceeds of the life insurance policy to the deceased's children from his first marriage. 
See id. at 485 n.1. Thus, Travelers, far from requiring a life insurer like PEHP to pay 
both the named beneficiary and the beneficiary under a divorce decree, holds only that, in 
equity, a divorce decree can direct the original payment of life insurance benefits between 
contending beneficiaries. See also Nielsen v. Nielsen, 535 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1975) 
(splitting life insurance benefit between ex-wife and widow where the amount of life 
insurance was more than the amount available at divorce); Madsen v. Estate of Moffitt, 
542 P.2d 187 (Utah 1975) (allowing ex-wife a portion oflife insurance proceeds up to the 
11 The Weltys' brief makes many broad questionable statements regarding the common 
@ 
law in Utah, such as, "The Life Program was in the best position, and were [sic] obligated @> 
to enforce the contractual rights established by the decree of divorce." Appellants' Br., at 
31. However, Appellants cite no authority for such a position, and PEHP believes there 
is none. The Weltys later similarly stated, "Life insurance programs ... bear the risk of 
double payment if they pay a beneficiary that replaced an irrevocable beneficiary 
designation." Id. at 33. Again, no authority is provided, and this is similarly untrue. See 
Crosby v. Crosby, 986 F.2d 79, 83 (4th Cir. 1993) (" ... an insurer is discharged from all @ 
subsequent liability when it makes good faith payments to a purported beneficiary 
without notice of any competing claims."). 
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amount held at the time of divorce). The Weltys are simply incorrect with regard to 
• PEHP when they state, "Utah law dictates that when a divorce decree orders that a 
beneficiary be irrevocable, subsequent changes of beneficiary are forbidden .... Utah 
contract law binds [PEHP] to perform in light of the terms of the decree of divorce 
submitted by Mr. Jesse Lopez." Appellants' Br., at 28-29. The implication is that the life 
insurer cannot accept any additional beneficiary changes after the divorce decree. This is 
not factually correct in any of the Utah cases as all involved situations when the 
beneficiary was changed. See, e.g., Nielsen, 535 P.2d 1239; Madsen, 542 P.2d 187. Of 
course a person ordered to maintain a certain beneficiary CAN change that beneficiary, it 
just means that they may be held in contempt for doing so by the divorce court. Id. 
Thus, a more correct way to phrase the Court's holdings under the Utah cases would be-
Parties to a divorce that are ordered to maintain beneficiaries on life insurance policies 
@ are forbidden from changing their beneficiary designations or risk being held in contempt 
of court for violating the decree of divorce. 
In harmony with the Utah cases, both legal scholars and other courts have 
recognized that when a court orders a beneficiary to be designated in a divorce decree, 
that this does not bind the life insurer . 
. . . [S]omething like irrevocability [ of a life insurance 
beneficiary] can result when the owner of the policy 
promises, or is ordered by a court, to designate a certain 
person as beneficiary, and not to change the designation 
thereafter. Such mandates involve only the owner, not the 
insurer[.} ... Of course, since the insurer is not involved, it 
may not be bound by the promise, or order, if the owner fails 
to name the appropriate beneficiary, or subsequently changes 
that designation .... 
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Kelvin H. Dickinson, Divorce and Life Insurance: Post Modern Remedies for Breach of 
a Duty to Maintain a Policy for a Designated Beneficiary, 61 Mo. L. Rev. 533,537 
(1996) (emphasis added). After finding that the ex-spouse had an equitable interest in a 
life insurance policy of the insured, the New York Court of Appeals articulated the rule 
that, "This is not to say that an insurance company may not rely on the insured's 
designation of a beneficiary. None of this opinion bears on the rights or responsibilities 
of the insurer in law or in equity." Simonds v. Simonds, 380 N.E.2d 189, 192 (N.Y. 
1978) (emphasis added). In other words, the divorce decree does nothing to bind the 
insurer, but only splits the benefits in equity between the competing beneficiaries. 
Even in the Weltys' cited cases from other state jurisdictions that support the Utah 
common law, 12 the Weltys did not point to one case that found divorce decrees binding 
12 See Appellant's Br., 21 n.3, citing Rollins v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 911, 
917 (?1h Cir. 1990) (holding under Indiana law that as between competing beneficiaries, 
unpaid life insurance proceeds in an amount existing at the time of divorce decree were 
properly placed in an equitable constructive trust for children of first marriage); 
Tintocalis v. Tintocalis, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 659 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that @ 
estate of deceased was liable to ex-wife for the value of life insurance proceeds defined in 
divorce under equitable constructive trust); Reeves v. Reeves, 223 S.E.2d 112, 115 (Ga. 
1976) ( determining between competing beneficiaries to allow minor children to receive 
unpaid life insurance proceeds in amounts in force on date of divorce); Appelman v. 
Appelman, 410 N .E.2d 199, 202-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) ( recognizing a cause of action for @ 
"imposition of a constructive trust upon the recipient of life insurance proceeds to which 
the plaintiff has an equitable claim"); Simonds v. Simonds, 380 N.E.2d 189, 195 (N.Y. 
1978) (holding named beneficiaries liable to ex-wife under theory of constructive trust 
when insurer had already paid life insurance proceeds to beneficiaries); McKissick v. 
McKissick, 560 P.2d 1366, 1368-69 (Nev. 1977) (concluding that life insurance proceeds 
received by second wife were held in constructive trust for the benefit of first wife and @ 
children pursuant to divorce decree); Thomas v. Studley, 571 N.E.2d 454, 459-60 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1989) (holding estate of deceased liable to ex-wife on behalf of minor child for 
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on the life insurer itself or that require a life insurance company to twice pay proceeds to 
@> competing beneficiaries. As such, PEHP requests this Court to uphold the common law 
by finding that divorce decrees apply only to the parties to the divorce, but do not bind 
non-parties, like PEHP, to create irrevocable beneficiaries. 
C. The Equities Favor PEHP Because the Weltys' Almost Six-Year Delay 
in Making a Claim Created an Irreparable Harm to PEHP in 
Reasonably Evaluating Their Claim. 
As a matter of law, PEHP paid the correct last named beneficiary of Mr. Lopez. 
However, even if this Court determines that PEHP paid the incorrect beneficiary, the 
Weltys' roughly six-year delay in bringing a claim for life insurance benefits prevented 
PEHP from timely investigating the Weltys' claims prior to payment. 
Mr. Lopez died on July 9, 2006. R. 243, ,r 14. On July 26, 2006, PEHP received a 
claim from Mary Ellen Lopez. Id. 1 16. Having received no other claim on the benefits, 
@ PEHP paid the life insurance benefit to Mary Ellen Lopez, the last named beneficiary, on 
or about August 2, 2006. R. 243-44, 117. The very first contact the Weltys made with 
PEHP after Mr. Lopez's death was on May 1, 2012, nearly six years later. See id. ,I 20. 
The Weltys made no claim at the hearing or in their brief that they did not know that Mr. 
Lopez had died, nor that they were unaware of the life insurance policy. Indeed, Ms. 
Welty admits to talking to Ms. Mary Ellen Lopez just after the death about payment of 
the life insurance proceeds to Ms. Welty on behalf of Jacob. R. 300, Respt.'s Hr'g Ex. 
M, ,r,r 1-2. The only excuse offered by Ms. Welty in failing to timely file a notice of 
amounts of life insurance awarded in divorce decree); excluding Utah cases discussed 
supra. 
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claim with PEHP was that she was told by Mary Ellen Lopez "that [Mary Ellen Lopez] 
had discussed the issue with her attorney, and that she did not have to pay any money to 
Jacob, but merely had to list Jacob on the title to her condo." Id. at ,r 2. 13 As a matter of 
equity, failure to even assert a claim against PEHP within nearly six years of the death is 
not what a reasonably diligent person would do to perfect a claim for life insurance 
benefits. 
In equity, PEHP should not be punished by having to pay the life insurance 
benefits twice due to the Weltys' failure to bring a timely claim. An evaluation of this 
equitable factor is akin to the common law doctrine of laches. "'The equitable doctrine 
of laches is founded upon considerations of time and injury. Laches in legal significance 
is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another."' Insight Assets, Inc. v. 
Farias, 2013 UT 47, ,r 17,321 P.3d 1021 (quoting Mawhinney v. Jensen, 232 P.2d 769, 
773 (Utah 1951)). "Lachesis 'based upon [the] maxim that equity aids the vigilant and 
not those who slumber on their rights."' Id. ( quoting CIG Exploration, Inc. v. State, 2001 
UT 37, ,r 14, 24 P.3d 966 (alteration in original)). '"[L]aches has two elements: (1) a 
party's lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that lack of diligence."' Id. ,I 19 
( quoting Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 
UT 51, ,r 27,238 P.3d 1054 (alternation in original)). 
13 This certainly begs the question as to whether the parties to the divorce had worked out 
a different arrangement outside the decree of divorce in regards to Mr. Lopez's life 
insurance obligations. It is certainly possible that Mr. Lopez promised Jacob the "condo" 
in exchange for changing the beneficiary on his PEHP life insurance. Nevertheless, this 
again highlights the impossible nature of an insurance company like PEHP being put in a 
position to enforce a divorce decree when the company was not a party to the divorce 
proceedings. 
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The principle embodied in the doctrine of laches directly applies to and prevents 
the Weltys' equitable claim. The Weltys failed to take any action with respect to Mr. 
Lopez's life insurance until nearly six years following Mr. Lopez's death. This certainly 
shows a lack of diligence when the filing of a claim would have sufficed to put PEHP on 
notice of a potential claim. Further, PEHP would be injured due to the Weltys' lack of 
diligence if it has to pay the benefit twice due to the Weltys' neglect when it only 
received premium for one life insurance benefit. Thus, the Weltys' equitable or public 
policy arguments should be rejected under the doctrine of laches because the Weltys 
waited nearly six years before attempting to bring a life insurance claim following the 
death of Mr. Lopez. 
In sum, the Weltys provide no equitable reason for this Court to disturb the 
Hearing Officer's ruling. Under the common law, absent bad faith, an insurance 
Ci company like PEHP cannot be held to pay the benefit twice. Utah cases support this 
position that divorce decrees may adjudicate life insurance rights between competing 
beneficiaries, but do not apply to non-party insurers. Furthermore, even considering the 
equities in this case, the equities fall in PEHP's favor because the Weltys waited roughly 
six years prior to asserting a claim for benefits against PEHP. 
CONCLUSION 
The Hearing Officer's Order that PEHP properly paid the last named beneficiary 
should be affirmed in both law and equity. Utah statutes specifically require PEHP to 
pay the last named beneficiary and then absolve PEHP, upon payment, from any 
additional liability. The PEHP Life Master Policy does the same. Thus, when PEHP 
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paid the last named beneficiary, it was released from any further liability as a matter of 
law. The Weltys' attempt to incorporate the Divorce Decree into the PEHP Master 
Policy fails because the language is not clear and unequivocal, and the Divorce Decree 
terms were never consented to by PEHP. 
In addition, even if this Court were to only look at the equities of the matter, PEHP 
should not be required to pay the life insurance benefit twice because it paid the claim in 
good faith. PEHP takes no position regarding the relative fairness of what Mr. Lopez did 
with his beneficiary designations with PEHP. Perhaps Mr. Lopez violated the terms of 
the Divorce Decree. But the Weltys' remedy for any alleged violation of the Divorce 
Decree is against the named beneficiary who received the proceeds or the estate of Mr. 
Lopez. PEHP cannot be held liable for someone else's alleged failure to discharge their 
duty. The equities fall in PEHP's favor since the Weltys waited almost six years after the 
death of Mr. Lopez to put PEHP on notice of their competing claim. For the foregoing 
reasons, PEHP requests that the Hearing Officer's Order, approved by the Board, be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this cfL\~ay of February, 2016. 
Associate General Counsel 
Utah Retirement Systems 
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
DIANE WELTY AND JACOB LOPEZ, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT 
BOARD, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' 
GROUP TERM LIFE PROGRAM, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND ORDER 
File #: 13-12L 
Hearing Officer: J. Dennis Frederick 
A hearing was held on July 16, 2015, before the Adjudicative Hearing Officer on 
Petitioners' Request for Board Action. Petitioners, Diane Welty and Jacob Lopez, were 
represented by Scott M. Rogers with Huntsman Lofgran, and Respondent, the Utah State 
Retirement Board ("USRB"), Public Employees' Health Program's ("PEHP,') Group Term Life 
Program ("Life Program"), was represented by Liza J. Eves with Howard, Larsen, Hansen & 
Eves, LLC. Based upon the testimony given, the evidence received and the l
1
egal memoranda 
submitted, the Adjudicative Hearing Officer issued a Ruling on July 16:, 2015, and requested that 
counsel for the PEHP Life Program prepare an order. The Adjudicative Hearing Officer now 
makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. 
1 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Parties stipulated to the following facts in writing prior to the hearing: 
1. Jesse Gavina Lopez ("Mr. Lopez,,) was employed by Salt Lake City Corporation 
("City,,) and was covered by a group term life insurance policy offered to City employees through the 
Public Employees, Health Program ("PEEP") Life Program. 
2. Mr. Lopez, and petitioner, Dia1_1e Welty ("Ms. Welty',) were married in August 1978 
and divorced in October 1997. 
3. On October 29, 1997, a Decree ofDivorce was ordered by Judge Pat B. Brian of the 
3rd District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
4. 
5. 
In the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Lopez was ordered as follows: 
24. That the Respondent currently has ir~ force and effect a life insurance policy on 
his life in the face amount of $325,000.00. That Respondent is ordered to maintain in 
full force and effect said life insurance policy until such time as the last of the parties, 
children reaches age 18 or alimony terminates, whichever is later. During the period 
that the child support is due, the Respondent should be ordered to irrevocably 
designate the Petitioner, as trustee for the minor children, beneficiary on said life 
insurance policy. The Respondent should be ordered to provide the Petitioner with 
proof that the insurance is in effect within 30 days of entry of the Divorce Decree and 
providing verification that said insurance is in effect by January 15th of each year 
thereafter. 
In July 1999, Mr. Lopez had coverage of$173,000.00 with the Life Program, of which 
$50,000.00 was funded by the City and the rest funded by Mr. Lopez. 
6. On December 3, 1999, PEHP received a Group Term Life Application from Mr. 
Lopez dated on or about November 29, 1999. The application indicated that Mr. Lopez was applying 
for $300,000.00 in Basic Group Term Life Coverage. The application named Diane (petitioner) for 
minor children as per attached divorce decree and Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as secondary 
beneficiary. Mr. Lopez's request for additional coverage was cancelled in December 1999 based 
upon contact from the Citfs Human Resources Department. 
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7. On December 3, l 999 the Life Program received a Beneficiary Change Form signed 
I) by Mr. Lopez on November 29:, 1999 which listed Petitioner:, "Diane (petitioner) for minor children 
as per attached divorce decree" as primary beneficiary and Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as secondary 
beneficiary. 
8. The Life Program received a written copy of the Decree of Divorce entered by the 
Third District of the State of Utah on October 29, 1997 attached to the Beneficiary Change Fonn 
submitted by Mr. Lopez on or about December 3, 1999. 
9. In a Verified Response to Petitioner's Order to Show Cause signed by Mr. Lopez on 
December 6, 1999, Mr. Lopez provided the following: 
a. On or about the 31st day of October:, 1997 this Court entered a Decree of 
Divorce based upon the entry of Respondent's default. 
~ b. The Decree of Divorce contained a number of misstatements of fact, some 
even inconsistent with the tenns of the Petition from which the default was 
taken. Respondent was not provided with a copy of the Decree of Divorce 
until long after the time to set the default had expired under Rule 60(b), 
U.R.C.P. 
c. In reality Respondent never had a life insurance policy on his life with a face 
Ci) amount of $325,000.00. 
d. At the time of divorce Respondent owned two policies. The first was a basic 
term policy offered through his employment for approximately $100,000. The 
second was a universal life insurance policy offered through Allstate 
Insurance which insured his life for only $50,000.00, and which also insured 
the life of Petitioner for $50,000.00. (See Exhibit "A") [Exhibit not included]. 
@) Thus, Respondent's factual burden to cany insurance has always been 
approximately $150,000.00. 
10. On July 24, 2003, the Life Program received an Additional Group Tenn Life 
@ Employee Enrollment Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about July 15, 2003. Mr. Lopez applied for 
additional coverage up to $300,000. The designated primary beneficiary was Petitioner Diane Lopez, 
his ex-wife for minor child $300,000 per divorce decree and his son Petitioner Jacob Lopez as 
contingent beneficiary. This beneficiary change form also reflects Jacob Lopez's ~ate of birth as 
3 
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August 27, 1988. However, Mr. Lopez did not complete underwriting requirements, and he was never 
® issued the additional coverage. 
11. In addition to the Additional Group Term Life Employee Enrollment Fonn on July 
24, 2003, PEHP received a Beneficiary Change Form signed on or about July 15, 2003, by Mr. Lopez. 
fi) The form revoked any previous nominations of beneficiazy(ies) and designated Mary Ellen Lopez his 
wife and his ex-wife Diane Lopez petitioner for minor child as primary beneficiaries. 
12. On October 24, 2003, PEHP received a Group Tenn Life Change Form signed by Mr. 
@, Lopez on or about October 21, 2003. The fonn stated in relevant part: "Revoking any previous 
nomination or beneficiary(ies), I hereby designate the following individuals to receive all benefits 
payable upon my death." Mr. Lopez designated Mary Ellen Lopez, his wife, as primary beneficiary 
~ and Joshua G. Lopez, his son, as contingent beneficiary. 
13. On March 20, 2006, PEHP received a Group Tenn Life/Accident Plan Beneficiary 
Change Fonn signed by Mr. Lopez on or about March 13, 2006. The form stated in relevant part: 
i) "Revoking any previous nomination or beneficiary(ies), I hereby designate the following individuals 
to receive all benefits payable upon my death. 11 Mr. Lopez designated Mary Ellen Lopez his wife as 
primary beneficiary. 
@ 14. Mr. Lopez died on July 9, 2006. 
15. Jacob Lopez was 17 years old at the time of Mr. Lopez's death. 
16. On July 26, 2006, PEHP received a Group Tem1 Life Program Claimant's Statement 
Ci from Mary Ellen Lopez. 
17. On or about August 2, 2006, PEHP issued a check in the amotmt of $173,000.00 to 
Mary Ellen Lopez, the beneficiary designated on the Group Tenn Life/ Accident Plan Beneficiary 
Change Form signed by Mr. Lopez on or about March 13, 2006. 
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18. The Life Program Group Tenn Life Master Policy (''Master Policy,,) is the 
contract between the Life Program and its covered members. 
19. The Master Policy states: 
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
If a Subscriber and/or Dependent dies, the Plan will pay to the beneficiary., 
subject to the provisions set forth herein, the amount of coverage for 
which the Subscriber and/or Dependent is covered. 
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary .... Any payment made in good 
faith pursuant to this provision fully discharges the Plan to the extent of the 
payment. 
BENEFICIARY 
A Subscriber shall designate a primary beneficiary and a contingent beneficiary at 
the time of application for coverage. A Subscriber may change his or her 
beneficiary(ies) by filing a written notice of the change with the Plan. The change 
will take effect as the date the Subscriber signed the notice of change ... Any 
payment made by the Plan in good faith pursuant to this provision shall fully 
discharge the Plan to the extent of such payment. 
MODIFICATION 
No change in this Master Policy shall be valid unless approved by the Plan and 
unless approved by the Plan and unless such approval is evidenced by 
endorsement or amendment to this Master Policy. No agent has authority to 
change this Master Policy or waive any of its provisions. 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
A written notice of claim must be given to the Plan within (20) days after the 
death of a Subscriber and/or Dependent unless it was not reasonably possible to 
do so. Notice given by or on behalf of a Subscriber and/or Dependent or his 
beneficiary if any, to the Plan at its office in Salt Lake City, Utah, with 
information sufficient to identify the Subscriber and/or Dependent., shall be 
deemed notice to the Plan. 
TIME OF PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
Benefits payable hereunder will be paid as soon as reasonably possible after 
receipt of an acceptable written proof of loss together with all supporting 
materials .... 
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
All benefits wiH be payable to the beneficiary. If any payment remains unpaid at 
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20. 
the death of the beneficiary, or if the beneficiary is a minor or is, in the opinion of 
the Plan, legally incapable of giving a valid receipt and discharge for any 
payment, the Plan, at its option, may pay such benefit to any relative or relatives 
by blood or connection by marriage of the Subscriber and/or Dependent who is 
deemed by the Plan to be equitably and legally entitled to receive the payment. 
Any payment made in good faith pursuant to this provision fully discharges the 
Plan to the extent of the payment. ... 
LEGAL ACTION 
No legal action may be brought against the Plan for unpaid benefits until at least 
sixty (60) days after written proof of loss has been furnished in accordance with 
the requirements stated above. No legal action may be brought after the 
expiration of three years after the time written proof of loss is required to be 
furnished. 
ENTIRE CONTACT 
This Master Policy, any modifications to it, and the written statements, if any, of 
Subscribers, constitute the entire contract. 
On August 28, 2012, Petitioner, Ms. Welty submitted a notice of claim to the Life 
Program in which she presented a dispute regarding the distribution of Mr. Lopez,s life insurance 
coverage. 
21. Ms. Welty indicated that Mr. Lopez .had a life insurance policy with Allstate Life 
Insurance in the amount of$300,000.00 on or about October 29, 1997. 
22. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-618 ''All data in the possession of the office is 
confidential, and may not be divulged by the office except as permitted by board action." Petitioners 
were not, and could not be, supplied with beneficiary designation infonnation until they brought this 
request for board action. 
23. On or about May I, 2012, Diane Welty and Jacob Lopez served a summons and 
complaint to Utah Retirement Services and PEHP in Third District Court to recover life insurance 
proceeds paid by PEHP through the Group Tenn Life Plan to Mary Ellen Lopez the designated 
beneficiary of Mr. Lopez. Mary Ellen Lopez was also named as a Defendant in this action. 
24. On September 19, 2012, the action brought in Third District Court against PEHP was 
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dismissed without adjudication because the Comt lacked subject matter jurisdiction over-the claims 
against PEI-IP. In a Declaration submitted in the Third District Court, Petitioner, Ms. Welty indicated 
the following: "1. Shortly after the death of my ex-husband, Mr. Lopez, I contacted Mrs. Lopez 
regarding the life insurance proceeds for my minor son, Jacob Lopez. 2. Mrs. Lopez told me that she 
had discussed the issue with her attorney, and that she did not have to pay any money to Jacob, but 
merely had to list Jacob on the title to her condo." 
25. Petitioners filed an Amended Request for Board Action on April 5, 2013. 
26. On September 3, 2013 Respondents waived all arguments relating to barring claims 
pursuant to an applicable statute oflimitations. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioners brought this action under Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613( 4) which ·states, ''The 
moving party in any proceeding brought under this section shall bear the burden of proof.,, 
PEHP is governed by Title 49, Chapter 20 of the Utah Code. 
The PEHP Life Program Master Policy is the contract between PEHP's Life Program and 
its covered members. 
4. Petitioners' Request for Board Action in this matter is a legal dispute distinguishable from 
® an equitable dispute. 
5. Pursuant to the Master Policy, the Life Program paid proceeds to the designated 
beneficiary listed on Mr. Lopez's Beneficiary Change Form, dated March 20, 2006. The 
LTD Program followed the procedures for the payment of life proceeds in accordance 
with the Master Policy terms created by statutory frame work. 
6. Petitioners did not meet their burden of proof that there was an error or legal defect in how 
the Life Program paid the beneficiary proceeds to Mary Ellen Lopez. 
7 
ORDER · · 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioners' request for the payment of life insurance 
proceeds because the Life Program paid the wrong beneficiary is denied. 
BOARD RECONSIDERATION 
Within ten (10) days of a Board order, any party may file a written request for 
reconsideration stating the specific grounds upon which relief is requested as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 49-11-613. This filing for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial 
review of the order on review. The request for reconsideration shall be filed with the Board and 
one copy sent by mail to each party by the person making the request. The Board chairman or 
executive director shall issue a written order granting or denying the request within twenty (20) 
days of receipt. If no order is issued within twenty (20) days, the request is denied. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
If any party is aggrieved with the final Board order, that party may seek a judicial review 
within thirty (30) days after the date that the order constituting final Board action is issued. The 
appealing party shall name the Board and all other appropriate parties as respondents. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final Board acti_ons resulting from formal 
proceedings. All parties shall follow the procedures established in Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-101 
et. seq. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Steven M. Rogers, Counsel for Petitioner 
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The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Adjudicative 
Hearing Officer are hereby adopted as the Order of the Utah State Retirement Board. 
Dated this ,z'«-- day of ~1.JqJr 
9 
, 2015. 
~RD 
~ ~e'sident 
@ .I I 'I. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this I '8"'-r<- day of August, 2015, I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the above Finding of Facts and Conclusions of Law and Order, postage pre-paid, to the 
following: 
Steven M. Rogers 
HUNTSMANjLOFGRAN 
623 East Fort Union Blvd., Suite 201 
Midvale, Utah 8404 7 
Liza Eves 
Howard, Larsen, Hansen & Eves, LLC 
560 East 200 South, Suite 230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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SELF-FUNDED AND ADMINISTERED GROUP 
TERM LIFE and ACCIDENT PLA·N. 
MASTER POLICY 
This Term Life and Accident Plan is created for its insureds, pursmmt to the term_s and conditions of Title 49, Chapter 20 
of tbe Utah Code Annotated. This Master Policy establishes the coverage and benefits available to Employees and their 
eligible Dependents. The provisions of these coverages are set forth in detail on subsequent pages. 
· Act OfTerrorism 
Means an act, including but not limited to the use 
of force or violence and/ or the threat thereof, of any 
person or group(s) of persons, whether acting alone or 
on behalf of or in connection with any organization(s) 
or govenunent(s), committed for political, religious, 
ideological or similar purposes including the intention 
to influence any government and/ or to put the public, 
or any section·of the public, in fear. An Act of Terrorism 
is a Catastrophic Event under this Master Poli_cy. 
Act Of War 
War, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities or war-
like operations (whether war be declared or not), civil_ 
war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection, civil commotion 
assuming the proportions of or amounting to an upris-
ing, military or usurped power. An Acfof War is not a 
Catastrophic Event under this Master Policy. 
Catastrophic Event 
Means all individual losses arising out of and directly 
occasioned by one sudden, unexpected, unusual specific 
event occurring at an identifiable time and place. How-
eve1~ the duration and extent of any such event shall be 
limited to 72 consecutive hams ,md within a 100 mile 
radius for any such event hereunde1~ and no individual 
loss which occurs outside such period c1nd/ or radius 
shall be included in that Catastrophic Event. PEHP may 
choose the date and time when such period of consecu-
tive hours commences and also the specific 100 mile 
radius determining an event. If any event is of greater 
duration than the above period, PEEP may divide that 
event into two or more events, provided that no two 
periods overlap and provided no period commences 
earlier than the date and time of the first recorded indi-
vidual loss to PEHP arising out of the event. 
»PEHP » WWW.PEHP.ORG 
Coverage 
The eligibility of a Subscriber and/ or Dependent to 
~enefits pro.vided und.er this Mpst.er Policy, subject to 
the terms, conditions, Limitations and Exclusions of this 
Master Policy. Benefits must be provided, a) when this 
Master Policy is in effect; b) prior to the date that any 
individual termination condition occurs. 
Dependent 
1. The Subscriber's iawful spouse. 
2. Chi,ldren or stepchildren of the Subscriber that are not 
arid have never been married up to the age of 26 who 
have a Parental Relationship ½ii.th the Subscriber. 
3. Unmarried legally adopted children, foster children, 
and children through legal guardianship up to the 
age of 26 are eligible subject to PEHP receiving 
adequate legal documentation. (Legal guardianship 
must be court appointed.) · 
4. Umnarried children who are incapable of self sup-
port because of an ascertainable mental or physical 
impairment, upon attaining age 26, may continue 
Dependent Coverage, while remaining totally dis-
abled, subject to the Subscriber's Coverage continu-
ing in effect. Periodic medical documentation is 
required. Insured must furnish written notificc1tion 
of the disability to PEI-IP no later ·than·31 days after 
the date the Coverage would i1orn.1ally terminate: In 
the notificc1tion, the Insured shall include the name 
of the Dependent, date of birth, a statement that the 
Dependent is LUunarried, and details concerning: 
>- The condition which led to the Dependent's 
physical or mental disability; 
>- Income, if any, earned by the Dependent; and 
> The capacity of the Dependent to engage in 
employment, attend school, or engage in normal 
daily activities. 
------- --- -··--- - - - -- . - ··- - - - - - --- - - ----
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>- ]f proof of disability is approved, the Depen~ 
dent's Coverage may be continued as Jong as he/ 
she remains totally disabled and unable to earn 
a living, and as long as none of the other causes 
of termination occur (e.g. marriage). Proof of the 
Dependent's continued disability may be re-
quired periodically by PEHP. 
5. Stepchildren who no longer have a Parental Rela-
tionship with a Subscriber will no longer be eligible 
to receive benefits under th.is Group Plan. 
6. Depenqent does not include an unborn fetus. 
Employee 
An Empl~yer's Emploiee who 'is eligible to emoll 111 the 
Group Term Life and Accident Plan. 
Employer 
The State, its educational institutions and political subdi-
visions that are eligible to participate and have elected to 
participate in the Public Employee's Benefit and Insur--
ance Program of Title 49, Chapter 20 of the Utah Code 
Annotated. 
Enrollment 
The process whereby an Employee makes written appli-
cation for Coverage tlu·ough PEHP, subject to specified 
time periods and policy provisions. 
Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Terrorism 
Means an event in any way caused or contributed by an 
act of terrorism involving the use or release or the threat 
thereof of any nuclear weapon or device or chemical or 
biological agent. Nuclea1~ Chemical or Biological Terror-
ism is not a Catastrophic Event w1der this master policy . 
Parental Relationship 
The relationship between a natural child or stepchild 
and a parent while the child or stepchild is dependent 
on the parent for insurance. Example-the stepfather has 
coverage on a child then divorces the child's natmal 
mother. The stepfather no longer has a Parental Relation-
ship with the child. 
Plan 
This plan 0£ coverage administered by the Public Em-
ployees Health Program. 
Subscriber 
An Employer's Employee who has enrolled for Cover-
age in the Group Term Life and/ or Accident Plan. 
SECTION I 
Accelerated Benefit 
The amount of group coverage which v,1ill be paid in 
advance of a Subscriber's death if the Subscriber is ter-
minally ill. 
Evidence Of lnsurability 
Evidence that c1n Employee enrolling for coverage meets 
the underwriting requirements of the Plan: 
Line-Of-Duty Death 
A death resulting from external force, violence, or dis-
ease occasioned by an act of duty as an employee. 
Terminally Ill 
A person is terminally ill if he or she has been diagnosed 
by a physician as having a medical condition which 
causes the Employee or Subscriber to have a life expec-
tancy of 18 months or less from the date of the diagnosis. 
The Subscriber must provide the Plan satisfactory proof 
of the limited life expectancy. Such proof must include 
certification by a physician. The Plan reserves the right 
to obtain a medical opinion from a second physician at 
its own expense. 
SECTION II 
· EMPLOYEE MINIMUM TERM COVERAGE 
Employee minimw11 Term Coverage is funded ex-
clusively by the Employer. Coverage is c1vailable in 
amounts up to $50,000, subject to an automatic 50% 
reduction cit age 71 and again at age 76. 
Line-of-Duty Death Benefit: If a Subscriber suffers a 
"Line-of-duty Death" the Plan will pay to the beneficia-
ry, subject to the provisions set forth herein, a lwnp sum 
in the amount of $50,000. 
Accident Benefit Rider - An employee who is killed in 
an accident will be eligible for an additional $10,000 ben-
efit, subject to the provisions of the Public Employees 
Health Program Group Accident Plan. 
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EMPLOYEE BASICTERM COVERAGE 
Einployees enrolled in Minimum Term Coverage may 
enroll in Basic Term Cove_rage. Employee Basic Tenn 
Coverage is funded exclusively by the Employee at rates 
to be determined by the Public Employees Health Plan. 
Employee Basic Term Coverage is available to Employ-
ees without Evidence of Insurabili~, if applied for within 
60 days of employment. Evidence of Insurability will be 
required if Employee Basic Term Coverage is applied 
for after the 60 day time period. Employee Basic Term 
Coverage is subject to automatic reductions at ages 71 
and 76. 
EMPLOYEE ADDITIONAL TERM COVERAGE 
{OPTIONAL) 
Eligible Subscribers may select optional coverage 
amounts, subject to underwriting requirements. If a Sub-
scriber covered by the Plan is also covered as a Spouse 
under Dependent coverage, the maximum cumulative 
coverage for any individual is $450,000. The maxi-
mum coverage for a spouse who is not an Employee is 
$450,000. 
Coveroge amounrs ore subjecr co auromolic 1ec/11aio11 at 091 71 and again or age 76 in amounts 
determined by rhe Public Employees Heaflh Plan. 
Evidence of Insurability will be required before cover-
age will be issued for Additional Term Coverage. The 
Plan has the right, if the Evidence of Insurability is not 
satisfactory, to decline coverage to the Subscriber and/ or 
Dependents. 
SPOUSE AND DEPENDENTTERM COVERAGE 
Subscriber may enroll Spouse and/ or Dependents in 
Dependent Term Coverage as follows: 
>- Spouse - Subscriber may enroll for Spouse Coverage 
in amounts from $5,000 to $450,000. 
Coverage amounts ore subject to automotic reducfi(:jl at age 71 and again at age 76 in 
amounts de/ermined b)' the Public Employees Heal/!, Pion. 
>- Children - Subscriber may enroll for Dependent 
Child Coverage for up to $10,000. 
Coverage far newborns is limited to S1,000 up /oage 6 months. The maximum Chlld 
Coverage is S 10,000 per eligible subsai/Jer. 
Underwriting Requirements 
A Spouse may be enrolled in up to $15,000 of SpoLtse 
Term Coverage within sixty (60) days of the Subscriber's 
date of hire without providing Evidence of InsLu-ability. 
A SpoLtse may apply for higher levels of coverage, which 
requires providing Evidence of Insurab.ilit:y. 
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A Subscriber who does.not apply for coverage for his or 
her Spouse or Dependents within sixty (60) days from 
the date of their eligibility, must furnish, at Subscriber's 
own expense, satisfactory evidence of the Dependen.f's 
insurability before the Dependent can obtain coverage. 
The Plan has the right, if the Evidence of Insurability 
is not salisfoctory, to decline coverage to the Spouse or 
Dependents. · 
GROUP TERM LIFE ACCELERATED BENEFIT 
Coverage Clause 
If a Subscriber is tenninally ill, the Plan will pay an 
Accelerated Benefit to the Subscriber. The Accelerated 
Benefit will be a percentage of the total term coverage in 
force on the life of the Terminally Ill Subscriber. The Ac-
ee! erated Benefit will not exceed 75% of the total cover-
age in force and will be paid either in one lmnp SLun or 
monthly payments as directed by the Subscriber. 
Conditions 
The Accelerated Benefit will be available to a Subscriber 
on a voluntary basis only. Therefore: 
>- If a Subscriber is required by law to use this option 
to meet the claim of creditors, whether in bankrupt-
cy or otherwise, the Subscriber is not eligible for this 
benefit, or 
• If a Subscriber is required by a government agency 
to use this option in order to qualify for, apply for, 
· or continue a government benefit or entitlement, the 
Subscriber is not eligible for th.is benefit. 
EFFECT ON COVERAGE 
The Accelerated Ben~fit payment will reduce the face 
amount of the group coverage m1d thus reduce corre-
spondingly the amount to be paid to the beneficiary(ies) 
upon the death of the Subsci:'iber:The redudio1i·will be · 
equal to the sum of the follovving amounts: 
• The amount paid under the Accelerated Benefits op-
tion; and 
>- An interest charge on the benefit amount commenc-
ing from the Accelerated Benefit payment date to the 
date of death calculated at the cun·ent yield on the 
ninety (90) day US Treasw-y Bill (to a maximum of 
18 months of interest); and 
>- Current monthly term coverage premiums the Sub-
scriber and/ or Employer was paying prior to the 
date of election of Accelerated Benefits commencing 
from the date of the first payment of the Accelerated 
Benefit LU1til the date of death. 
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PEHP PLUS TERM LIFE OPTION 
An Ernployee or spouse who has been declined cover-
age because of PEHP underwriting requirements may 
qualify for coverage, if approved, under the PEHP"Plus · 
Term Life option. Specific underwriting requirements 
and higher rates have been established for this option. 
For more infonrnition regarding PEI-IP Plus, contact 
PEHP at 801-366-7495 or 800-753-74:95 . 
LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONS 
Group Term Life Suicide Exclusion 
For Subscribers, with respect to any amounts in excess . 
of Minimum Term Coverage, or fot: Dependerits with re-
spect to all coverage, benefits ·will not be paid or payable 
if the Subscriber and/ or Dependent commits suicide 
within hvo years of the effective date of coverage. Any 
premiums paid for such coverage will be refunded. 
Homicide Exclusion 
Accidental deaths are routinely investigated. Absolutely 
no benefit will be paid to a beneficiary if the beneficiary 
intentionally takes the life of the insmed Subscriber 
and/ or dependent. 
Misstatement Of Material Fact 
In the absence of fraud, the validity of any coverage will 
not be contested, except for nonpayment of premiwns, 
after it has been in force for h~ro years from the effective 
date of coverage. No statement made by any person 
relating to his or her ability to be covered wilt be used 
in contesting the validity of the coverage with respect 
to which the statement was made after th~ coverage has 
been in force, prior to the con.test, for a period of two 
years during the person's lifetime, nor will the statement 
be used unless it is contained in a ·written insh·ument 
signed by the covered individual. : 
GENERAL INFORMATION 
' When a Subscriber selects additional coverage amounts, 
the Subscriber may do so subject to the Employer's elec-
tion and the Plan limitations. If the Employer changes to 
a lesser amount of coverage, the Subscriber's coverage 
will be decreased to conform to the new election and 
effective as of the first day of the Subscriber's annual 
enrollment. (See Section III, Effective Date of Coverage) 
If a Subscriber's coverage amount changes due to age, 
the Subscriber's coverage will be decreased to the cor-
rect coverage amount as of the elate the Subscriber's age 
changes. 
Any changes in coverage amounts will be effective on 
the date specified in writLng by the Plan. 
All Employees must be enrolled in Employee :tviinimum 
Term Coverage. 
The Plan reserves the right to decline coverage of an 
Employee and/ or Dependent if Evidence of Insurability 
is not satisfactory. 
Employees Entering Late 
An Employee who does.not apply for coverage within 
sixty (60) days from the date of eligibility, or who reap-
plies for coverage after his or her coverage has been 
canceled at the Empl.oyee' sown request or without 
termination of employment, .must fLu-rush satisfactory 
Evidence of Insurability in order to obtain coverage. An 
Employee who does not apply for coverage for his or 
her Dependents within sixty (60) days from the date of 
eligibilit}~ must furnish, at the Employee's expense, sat-
isfactory evidence of the Dependent's insurability before 
the Dependent can obtain coverage. The Plan has the 
right to decline coverage if the Evidence of Insurability 
is not satisfactory. 
Coverage When Disability Coverage Exists 
If a Subscriber is receiving long-term disability benefits 
pursuant to a policy or p lan issued to the Employer 
and whose disability occurred while the Subscriber was 
covered under this coverage, Minimum Coverage will 
continue as long as the Subscriber receives the long-term 
disability benefit. I£ a Subscriber who is receiving long-
term d isabili t}' benefits and is eligible under this provi-
sion dies, the Plan will pay to the beneficiary the benefit 
amount of the Minimum Term Life Cove.rage for which 
the Subscriber is covered. PEHP will have the right to 
require proof that the Subscriber is still receiving long-
term disability benefits. 
A Subscriber may continue Additional Term coveragt? 
in the Scjme amount that was in effect on the date of 
disability for a maximum of twelve (12) months from 
the date of disabilit}r with the current premium waived 
for twelve (12) months. After t1,velve (12) months, the 
Subscriber funded por tion of Additional Term coverage 
may be continued, but is limited to 50% of the amount 
of coverage for which the SL1bscriber was enrolled at the 
end of the twelve (12) month period from the date of 
disability. Application for this coverage must occur with 
i..i1 sixty (60) days from the end of the twelve (12) month 
period referred to above. Eligibility for this coverage will 
continue for as long as the Subscriber receives long-
term disability benefits. Separate rules for t)us coverage 
may be established by the Plan. I£ a Subscriber becomes 
ineligible to receive long-term disability benefits and the 
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Employer has maintained continuous Additional Term 
coverage with the Plan, the existing coverage in effect 
may be continued under the Continuation of Coverage 
• provision. 
GROUP TERM LIFE CONTINUATION OF COVERAGE 
An individual covered under this Plan does not have 
a right to convert coverage to an individual policy in 
the event that the person loses coverage hereunder 
for any reason. Howevet~ a Subscribe1· and his or her 
· Dependents may continue partial coverage hereunder if, 
after losing eligibility, the Subscriber and/ or his or her 
Dependents continue to be member(s) of any retirement 
system sponsored by the Utah Retirement Systems and: 
pay premiums. 
Coverage under this provision is limited to 25% of 
the amount of coverage for which the individual was 
enrolled on the date preceding the date of loss of eligibil-
ity. Separate rates for this coverage v,rill be established 
by the Plan. Application for this coverage must occur 
within sixty (60) days from the date of loss of eligibility 
as an active Employee or termination of coverage Lmder 
the Plan. A line-of-Duty Death benefit is not part of the 
continuation coverage under this section. 
MISSTATEMENT OF AGE 
If the age of any Subscriber and/ or Dependent has been 
misstated, the Plan will make a premium adjushnent 
so that the Plan shall be fully charged or credited, as 
the case may be, for the difference in premiums for the 
full time any coverage has been in force. If the amount 
of coverage would have been affected by the misstate-
ment of age, the amount shall be adjusted to the amount 
which the Subscriber and/ or Dependent would have 
been entitled at h.is or her correct age, and the adjust-
ment of premium shall be based on such adjusted · 
amount of coverage. 
PREMIUM CALCULATION 
Any premiums payable may be adjusted amu1ally to de-
termine an average premium rate per $1,000 of coverage 
then in force. Premium rates will be determined on the 
attained age to the nearest birthday of each Subscriber 
and/ or Dependent, and the amount of coverage on each 
Subscriber and/ or Dependent. 
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SECTION Ill 
Annual Salary 
The amount certified by the Employer as the monthly 
salary, excluding such. amounts as overtime, bonuses, 
discretionary payments, etc., of the Subscriber. If there 
is a discrepancy belween the certified amount and the 
amount actually paid, PEI-IP shall determine the regL1lar 
monthly salary. 
Hospital 
1. An institution, which is licensed by the state in 
which it resides, accredited by the Joint Commission 
for Accreditation (JCAHO), and maintains Medicare 
and Medicaid approval for services. 
2. Any other institution which is operated pursuant to 
law, under the supervision of a staff of physiciai,s 
and with twenty-four .hour per day nursing service, 
which is primarily engaged in providing; 
:> General inpatient medical care and treahnent of 
sick and injured persons through medical, diag-
nostic, and major surgical facilities, all of which 
facilities must be provided on its premises or 
under its control, or 
>- Specialized inpatient medical care and treat-
ment of sick or injured persons tlu·ough medical 
and diagnostic facilities (including x-ray and 
laboratory) on its prem.ises, under its conh·ol, or 
through a written agreement or with a special-
ized Provider of those facilities. 
In no event shall the term Hospital include a facility. 
operated primarily as an out-patient or free standing 
unit, or a convalescent nmsing home or an institution or 
part !:hereof which is Hsed principally as a convalescent, 
rest, or nursing facili ty or facj]ity for tl,e aged, or which 
furnishes primarily domiciliary or Custodial Care, in-
cluding training in the routines of daily living, or which 
is operated primarily as a school. 
Injury 
A bodily injury sustained solely thorough accidental 
means and independently of all other causes and occurs 
,,vhile coverage is in effect Lmder the policy; except that, 
witl1 respect to the Accident Weekly Indemnity and 
Accident Medical Expense Benefit, it means any sue~ 
bodily injury for which no benefits are payable under a 
worker's compensation or similar law or act. 
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Loss Of A Limb 
Loss by physical separation of a hand at or above the 
wrist, or of a foot at or above the ankle. 
Loss Of Hearing 
Loss of hearing which is certified as being entire and 
irrecoverable by a licensed physician specializing in 
otolaryngology and certified by the American Board of 
Otolaryngology. 
Loss Of Sight 
Loss of sight which is certified as being entire and 
irrecoverable by a licensed physician specializing in 
ophthalmology and certified by the American Board of 
Ophthalmology . 
Loss Of Speech 
Loss of speech which is certified as being entire and 
irrecoverable by a licensed physician specializing in 
otolaryngology and certified by the American Board of 
Otolaryngology . 
Loss OfThumb And Index Finger 
Loss by physical separation through or above the meta-
carpophalangeal joints. 
Loss Of Use 
With respect to Arm or Leg, paralysis resulting in total 
loss of all range of motion and use of such limb which 
continues without interruption for a period of twelve 
(12) months and at the end of such period is determined 
by competent medical authority to be continuous, per-
manent and irrecoverable. 
MEDICAL EXPENSE 
The actual expenses incurred for: 
>- Treatment by a legally qualified ·physician or sur-
geon: or 
:>- Confinement within a hospital; or 
:>- Employment of a licensed or graduate nurse; or 
>- X-ray examination; or 
>- Use of a professional ambulance service for local 
transportation of a subscriber; provided the expense 
has been incurred for necessary services, confine-
ment or treatment given within one year of the date 
of the accident, and the charges therefore are reason-
able and customary for the locale . 
TOTAL DISABILITY 
The Subscriber is unable to engage in his regular occu-
pation and is not engaged in any other-occupation, and 
during such period is under the regular care and· atten-
dance of a legally qualified· physician or surgeon: 
SECTION ii 
ACCIDENTAL DEATH, DISMEMBERMENT, LOSS OF 
USE AND LOSS OF SIGHT BENEFIT (AD&D) 
Employee Coverage Only (Individual Plan) 
A Subscriber may select any amount of Principal Sum 
ranging from $25,000 to $250,000. 
Employee And Dependent Plan 
(Family Plan) 
Under the Family Plan a Subscriber may select any 
amount of Principal Sum for Subscriber on the same 
basis as for the Individual Plan, and then eligible De-
pendents are automatically covered as follows: spouse is· 
automatically insured for a Principal Sum equal to 40% 
of Subscriber's Principal Sum and each eligible Depen-
dent child is insured for 15% of Subscriber's Principal 
Sum. If Subscriber has no eligible dependent children, 
the spouse's Principal Sum is increased to 50% of Sub-
scriber's I?rinci pal Sum. If no spouse is eligible, each 
eligible dependent child's Principal Sum is increased to 
20% of Subscriber's Principal Sum. 
ACCIDENT WEEKLY INDEMNITY BENEFIT (AWi) 
(OPTIONAL COVERAGE) 
Employee Coverage Only (Not Available For 
Dependents) 
If a Subscriber is enrolled in AD&D coverage under this 
Group Accident Plan, in addition to the AD&D cover-
age he or she may purchase Accident Weekly Indemnity 
coverage which will pay the Subscriber benefits while he 
or she is totally disabled because of injury resulting Erom 
an accident which was not job related or.which did not 
occur on the job, provided such total disability started 
within 90 days of the accident. Coverage begins on the 
first day of total disability and is payable while such dis-
ability continues, but for not more than 52 weeks for any 
L one accident. ~ •r }i:;:~ ;,tNT PEHP )} WWW.PEHP.ORG }) 
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Amounts Of Coverage And Cost 
Subscribers may purchase the AWI Coverage in units 
up to $500, subject to the maximum amount indicated in 
the Monthly Gross Salary bracket. The Subscriber may 
purchase a lesser amount than the maximum amount .in-
dicated for their salary bracket but not a greater amount. 
The coverage table can be fow1d i11 the Life and Accident 
Brochure. 
ACCIDENT MEDICAL EXPENSE BENEFIT (AME)_ 
(OPTIONAL COVERAGE ) · 
Employee Coverage Only {Not Available For 
Dependents) · 
If a Subscriber is enrolled as an Employee for AD&D 
coverage under this Group Accident Plan, in addition to 
the AD&D coverage (and Weekly Indemnity coverage, 
if elected) he or she may purchase Accident Medical Ex-
pense coverage which will pay for the follov,ring medical 
expenses which are in excess of expenses covered by 
all_ other Group Medical Plans and by No Fault Auto-
mobile Insurance. Such medical expenses include the 
reasonable costs inci.irredfor treatment by a physician or 
surgeon, for hospital confinement, and for employment 
of a licensed or graduate nurse necessitated by injury 
resulting from an accident which was not job related 
or did not occur on the job, provided the expense was 
incurred within one year of the date of the acci~ent. 
Amounts Of Coverage And Cost 
Subscriber may purchase the Accident Medical coverage 
in an amount of $2,500. 
RESERVE - NATIONAL GUARD COVERAGE 
:> Subject to the terms and conditions of the policy, 
coverage shall apply while the Subscriber hereun-
d~r is a member of a!) organized Reserve Corps or • 
National Guard Unit of the United States and: 
>- In attendance at annual field b-aining, cruise or other 
active duty or training period of fewer that 30 days 
(except that while attending a service school the cov-
erage will extend for the duration of the school even 
though in excess of 30 days), or is enroute to or from 
such training; or 
• Participating in a properly authorized periodic .inac-
tive duty training assembly or any other inactive duty 
training authorized by appropriate unit orders; or 
>- Participating as a member of his/ her unit or detach-
ment in an authorized parade, exhibition or ceremo-
ny on official orders. 
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LIMITATIONS AND EXCLUSIONS 
Air Travel 
The Policy, subject otherwise to its terms, limitations arid 
condition, covers claims arising out of bodily injury s·us-
tained by an Insured Person while riding as a passenger 
in, alighting from, or boarding (but not while operating, 
learning to operate or serving as a member of a crew of) 
a civil aircraft having a valid airworthiness certificate 
from the governmental authority having jurisdiction 
over private aircraft in the country of its registry and 
flown by crop-dusting, seeding, skywriting, racing or 
exploration. 
Exclusions 
The policy does not cover any loss or claim arising out 
of bodily injury caused or contributed to by or resulting 
from: 
• Engaging in or taking part in naval, military or air 
force service or operations, except as provided in the 
Reserve- National Guard provision; 
>- Riding or driving in any kind of race as a profes-
sional; 
>- Being in or on or boarding an aircraft for the pur-
pose of flying therein or alighting there from fol-
lowing a flight, except as specified in the Air Travel 
provision; 
>- Suicide or attempted suicide; 
>- .intentionally self-inflicted .injUI")~ or committing or 
attempting to commit a criminal or felonious act; 
.> Disease or natural causes, or medical or surgical 
treatment (except where the treatment is rendered 
necessary by.bodily injury caused by accident 
within the scope of the policy); 
)+- Voluntary self0 administration of any drug or chemi-
cal substance not prescribed by and taken according 
to the directions of a licensed physician (accidental 
ingestion of a poisonous substance is not excluded); 
or 
>- Any loss caused b)~ resulting from or contributed 
to by the insured's intoxication. An insured will be 
considered to be intoxicated if the level of alcohol in 
his/her blood when the injury odoss occurs exceeds 
the amount at which a person is presttrned, ,mder 
the law of the locale in which the accident occurred, 
to be under the influence of alcohol or intoxicating 
liquor when operating a motor vehicle . 
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SECTION V 
EFFECTIVE DATE OF COVERAGE 
The effective date of the coverage is the day following 
the end of the payroll period for which the first payroll 
premium deduction is made. Howevei~ if the covered 
Subscriber is not actively at work and engaging in and 
performing his or her normal duties on a regular basis 
except for duties performed at home or while confined 
in a hospital on the effective date, coverage will become 
effective on the day he or she returns to active work. If 
the Dependents of a Subscriber are to be covered, and 
if a Dependent is confined to a hospital on the effective 
date of the Subscriber's coverage, the coverage of the 
Dependent will not become effective until the day after 
he or she is discharged. Dependent coverage is not effec-
tive prior to an Employee's effective date . 
ELIGIBILITY 
All Employees and their Dependents are eligible. 
An individual who becomes a Dependent after the Sub-
scriber's effective date will be eligible for coverage on 
the date he or she becomes a Dependent, provided the 
Subscriber submits a written application for coverage 
within sixty (60) days of that date. Coverage for prospec-
tive adoptive children will become effective on the date 
the child is placed for purposes of adoption provided a 
written application for coverage is received by the Plan 
within sixty (60) days of that date. 
If, within sixty (60) days after the date upon which a 
Dependen.t child's coverage would othenvise terminate 
due to a maximum ·age limitation, the Plan has received 
a statement from a physician that·the child is mentally . . 
or physically incapable of earning a living and is de-
pendent upon the Subscriber for support, coverage will 
continue for the child for so long as incapacity continues. 
TERMINATION OF COVERAGE 
The coverage on any Subscriber ceases automatically on 
whichever of the following dates occurs first: 
> The date th.is coverage is canceled; or 
>- The end of a coverage period for which a premium 
contribution was made if the Subscriber requests 
termination or has become ineligible, except: 
(i) when a Subscriber ceases employmer).t because 
of injury or sickness, he or she will remain eli-
gible tq continue coverage for up to twelve (12) 
months if injury or sickness persis.ts to·.that time. 
Premiums must be pa~d for coverage to continue. 
Termination occurs when the employer discon-
tinues a Subscriber's coverage by so notifying the 
Plan or discontinuing premium payment, ·but in 
any event no later than twelve (12) months fol-
lowing cessation of employment due to injury or 
sickness; or 
(ii) when a Subscriber ceases active work with his or 
her Employer due to temporary layoff or leave of 
absence, or for any other-reason other than sick-
ness or injury as described above, termination of 
employment shall be deemed to have occurred 
no later than twelve (12) months following the 
cessation of active full-time work. Premiun1s 
must be paid for coverage to continue. 
• The date in which the Subscriber retires unless the 
Employer has established a program, with which 
the Plan has agreed, to continue coverage beyond 
retirement. 
TERMINATION OF DEPENDENTS COVERAGE 
The coverage on any Dependent ceases automatically on 
whichever of the following dates occurs first 
• Six (6) months following the date the Subscriber's 
coverage terminates due to the death of the Sub-
scriber. During the six-month period between the 
death of the Subscriber.and the date of the tern,ina-
tion of the Dependent coverage, the premium pay-
ment for the Dependent coverage will be waived; 
> The end of a coverage period for which a premium 
contributioq was made if the $ubscriber fails to 
make any subsequently required premium contribu-
tions. 
>- The date the Dependent becomes eligible for cover- · 
age as an Employee under this coverage. 
>- The date the Dependent becomes a full-time mem-
ber of the military. 
>- The date of attainment of the maximLUn age for cov-
erage described herein. 
>- The date the Dependent (spouse) is not considered 
the Subscriber's lawful spouse as indicated in a 
divorce decree. 
>- The date the Subscriber's coverage terminates for 
any reason other than death of the Subscriber, in-
cluding Subscriber's retirement. 
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CATASTROPHIC COVERAGE 
• Aggregate benefits payable for any single Cata-
strophic Event shall be limited to $50 million per 
year. If benefits payable due. to a Catastrophic Event 
exceed $50 Million, benefits shall be paid on a pro 
rata ba'sis. 
• Aggregate benefits payable due to Acts of Terrorism 
shall be limited to $50 :tvlillion per year. 
• Benefits under this Master Policy shall be subject to 
all of the limitations, exclusions and terms of any 
reinsurance coverage in place to reinsure the cover-
ages available under this Master Policy. 
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
If a Subscriber and/ or Dependent dies, the Plan will 
pay to the beneficiary, subject to the provisions set forth · 
herein, the amount of coverage for which the Subscriber 
and/ or Dependent is covered. Unless otherwise re-
quested in writing by the Subscriber, benefits payable as 
a result of the death of a Dependent shall be paid to the 
Subscriber, if living or otherwise, to the next qf kin of the 
deceased in the order of precedence established under 
Title 75, Chapter 2, the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
BENEFICIARY 
A Subscriber shall designate a primary beneficiary 
and a contingent beneficiary at the time of applica-
tion for coverage. A Subscriber may change his or her 
beneficiary(ies) by filing a written notice of the change 
with the Plan. The change shall take effect as of the date 
the Subscriber signed the notice of change, whether or 
not the Subscriber is living at the time of such filing, but 
without prejudice to the Plan on account of any pay-
ment made by it before receipt of such notice. If there 
is no beneficiary designated by the Subscriber or if the 
desi211ated beneficiary is not alive at the death of the 
- 0 • 
Subscriber and/ or Dependent, the Plan will pay the ben-
efits of this coverage to the contingent beneficiary, and if 
there is no contingent beneficiary the Plan will pay the 
benefit amounts of this coverage to the next of kin of the 
deceased in the order of precedence established under 
Title 75, Chapter 2, the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Any 
payment made by the Plan in good faith pursuant to this 
provision shall fully discharge the Plan to the extent of 
such payment. 
If the primary beneficiary survives the Subscriber but 
dies before the benefit is paid, the benefit shall be paid to 
the contingent beneficiary. 
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SECTION VI 
CONFORMITY 
Any provision of this Plan which, on its Effective Date, 
is in conflict with the applicable law shall be deem_ed to 
conform to the minimum requirements of the law. 
MODE OF PAYMENT 
Unless otherwise arranged with the Subscriber, all pre-· 
miums due from the Subscriber shall be paid to the Plan 
by withholding premiums from the pay checks of the 
Subscriber and forwarded to the Plan by the Employer. 
Premiums withheld shaU be deemed tq have been re-
ceived by the Plan, but shall not constitute payment for 
coverage under this coverage if coverage has otherwise 
terminated. 
ENTIRE CONTRACT' 
This Master Policy, any modifications to it, and the 
written statements, if any, of Subscribers, constitute the 
entire contract. 
MODIFICATION 
No change in this Master Policy shall be valid unless 
approved by the Plan and unless such approval is evi-
denced by endorsement or am_endment to this Master 
Policy. No agent has authority to change this Master 
Policy or waive any of its provisions. 
DATA TO BE FURNISHED 
· Subscribers are required to furnish to the Plan, when 
and so often as the Plan may reasonably require, all 
information as may be considered to have a bearing on 
the administration of the coverage under this Plan or the 
determination of the premium therefore. The Plan shall 
have the right to inspect, during normal business ~1ours, 
an Employee's payroll and such other records wluch 
pertain to the coverage provided hereunder. 
CLERICAL ERROR 
Clerical error in keeping records shall not invalidate 
coverage otherwise in force nor continue coverage 
otherwise terminated. Premium adjustments shall be 
made if a clerical error has caused an incorrect amount 
of premium to be collected or paid. £r::;·& 
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RATE SCHEDULES 
The Plan may revise any premium rate schedule no 
more frequently than annually unless a change in the 
coverage affecting rates occurs, and then maj, do so 
·upon the effective date of such change. 
SECTION VII 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
A v,,ritten notice of claim must be given to the Plan with-
in nventy (20) days after the death of a Subscriber and/. 
or Dependent unless it was not reasonably possible to 
do so. Notice given by or on behalf of a Subscriber and/ 
or Dependent or his beneficiary if an:}~ to the Plan at its 
office in Salt Lake Cit)~ Utah, with information sufficient 
to identify the Subsaiber and/ or Dependent, shall be 
deemed notice to the Plan. 
CLAIM AND PROOF OF LOSS FORMS 
When the Plan receives a notice of a claim, it ,,.,m furnish 
to the claimant the form it customarily uses to establish 
proof of loss. If such forms are not furnished within 15 
d·ays after the receipt of the notice of claim, the claimant 
shall be deemed to have complied with the requirements 
as to proof of death. Once supplied, the written proof of 
.Joss together with all supporting materials necessary to 
establish proof of loss must be returned to the Plan at its 
office within 90 days after the date of the death caus-
ing the loss under this coverage. Failure to furnish such 
proof within the time required will not invalidate or 
reduce any claim if it was not reasonably possible to give . 
proof within such.time, provided.such proof.is furnished . 
as soon as reasomibly possible. 
TIME OF PAYMENT OF BENEFITS 
Benefits payable hereunder will be paid as soon as 
reasonably possible after receipt or an acceptable written 
proof of loss together with all supporting materials. 
If benefits are not paid within 30 days, interest will begin 
to accrue 30 days following the Plan's receipt of proof of 
loss form and supporting materials. Th e interest rate will 
be based on the current yield on the ninety (90) day US 
Treasury Bill and will be fixed on the date that interest 
begins to accrue. 
PAYMENT OF BENEFITS . 
All benefits will be payable to the beneficiary. If any 
payment remains unpaid at the death of the beneficiary, 
· · or if the beneficiary is a minor or is, in the opinion of 
the Plan, legally incapable of giving a valid receipt and 
discharge for any payment, the Plan, at its option, may 
pay such benefit to any relative or relat ives by blood 
or connection by marriage of the Subscriber and/ or 
Dependent who is deemed by the Plan to be equitably 
and legally entitled to receive the payment. AJ.1.y pay-
ment made in good faith pursuant to th.is provision fully 
discharges the Plan to the extent of the payment. If there 
is no designated beneficiary living at the death of the 
Subscriber and/ or Dependent as to all _or any part of the 
sum, the Plan may pay a part of that sum, not exceeding 
$5,000 to any person appearing to the Plan to be equita-
bly entitled to the money. 
LEGAL ACTION 
No legal action may be brought against the Plan for 
unpaid benefits until at least sixty (60) days after writ-
ten proof of loss has been furnished in accordance with 
the requirements stated above. No legal action may be 
brought after the expiration of three years after the time 
written proof of loss is required to be furnished. 
PHYSICIAN EXAMINATION 
The Plan, at its own expense, shall have the right to 
require any Subscriber and/ or Dependent to undergo 
and report the findings of a physical examination when 
and as often as it ID?Y reasonably require. Additionall)~ 
the Plan, at its own discretion and expense, may require 
that an autopsy be performed on the body of a deceased 
Subscriber al')d/ or Dependent during the pend ency of a 
claim hereunder. 
MEDICAL REPORT 
At the time of the claim, the Plan, at its own expense, has 
the right and opportunity to examine and receive medi-
cal reports, medical records, and hospital records relat-
ing to the care, treahnent, and relevant medical history 
of the person whose death is the basis for a claim. Any 
person claiming benefits shall cooperate with the Plan as 
necessary to implement this provision. 
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APPEALS 
If a claim is denied, in whole or in part, the Plan will 
send a written notice specifying the reason(s). If a 
Subscriber and/ or Dependent, his or her beneficiary, or 
an authorized representative disagrees with ~he denial 
or disagrees with any decision made by the Plan which. 
affects them, he or.she may request a full review of the 
claim or submit the grievance by writing to: 
PEHP Life Review Committee 
. 560 East 200 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
An appeal must be submitted within sixty (60) days after 
receiving the notice of an adverse action of the Plan. If 
the Subscriber and/ or Dependent, beneficiary or repre-
·sentative desires to appeal the decision of that commit-
tee, the appeal must be directed to the Executive Direc-
'tor of the Utah Retirement Systems. Further appeal may 
be made in accordance with the procedure established 
under Section 49-11-613 et seq, Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended, 1953. A copy of this procedure is available 
from the PEHP Claims Review Committee . 
»PEHP » WWW.PEHP.ORG 
ADDENDUMC 
§ 49-11-609. Beneficiary designations--Revocation of beneficiary ... , UT ST § 49-11-609 
KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment 
Prooosed Leoislation 
I West's Utah Code Annotated 
I Title 49. Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act (Refs & Annas) 
[Chaoter 11. Utah State Retirement Systems Administration 
I Part 6. Procedures and Records 
U.C.A. 1953 § 49-11-609 
§ 49-11-609. Beneficiary designations--Revocation of beneficiary designation--Procedure--Beneficiary not 
designated--Payment to survivors in order established under the Uniform Probate Code--Restrictions on 
payment--Payment of deceased's expenses 
Currentness 
( 1) As used in this section, "member" includes a member, retiree, participant, covered individual, a spouse of a retiree 
@ participating in the insurance benefits created by Sections 49-12-404 and 49-13-404, or an alternate payee under a domestic 
relations order dividing a defined contribution account. 
(2) The most recent beneficiary designations signed by the member and filed with the office, including electronic records, at 
the time of the member's death are binding in the payment of any benefits due under this title. 
(3)(a) Except where an optional continuing benefit is chosen, or the law makes a specific benefit designation to a dependent 
spouse, a member may revoke a beneficiary designation at any time and may execute and file a different beneficiary 
designation with the office. 
(b) A change of beneficiary designation shall be completed on forms provided by the office. 
@ (4)(a) All benefits payable by the office may be paid or applied to the benefit of the surviving next of kin of the deceased in 
the order of precedence established under Title 75, Chapter 2, Intestate Succession and Wills, if: 
(i) no beneficiary is designated or if all designated beneficiaries have predeceased the member; 
(ii) the location of the beneficiary or secondary beneficiaries cannot be ascertained by the office within 12 months of the 
date a reasonable attempt is made by the office to locate the beneficiaries; or 
WESTLAW .;, ' ,,' ' -:: ~ 
§ 49-11-609. Beneficiary designations--Revocation of beneficiary ... , UT ST § 49-11-609 
(iii) the beneficiary has not completed the forms necessary to pay the benefits within six months of the date that 
beneficiary forms are sent to the beneficiary's last-known address. 
(b)(i) A payment may not be made to a person included in any of the groups referred to in Subsection (4)(a) if at the date 
of payment there is a living person in any of the groups preceding it. 
(ii) Payment to a person in any group based upon receipt from the person of an affidavit in a form satisfactory to the 
office that: 
(A) there are no living individuals in the group preceding it; 
(B) the probate of the estate of the deceased has not been commenced; and 
(C) more than three months have elapsed since the date of death of the decedent. 
@ (5) Benefits paid under this section shall be: 
(a) a full satisfaction and discharge of all claims for benefits under this title; and 
(b) payable by reason of the death of the decedent. 
Credits 
Laws 1987, c. 1, § 25; Laws 1989, c. 81, § 8; Laws 1998, c. 267, * 2, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 2000, c. 283, * 3, eff March 
16, 2000; Laws 2001, c. 141, * 5, eff. March 15. 2001; Laws 2002, c. 250, * 32. eff. March 26, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 240. * 
11, eff. May 5, 2003: Laws 2004, c. 118, * 4, eff. July l. 2004; Laws 2005, c. 116. * 6, eft: May 2, 2005. 
Codifications C. 1953, § 49-1-606. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 49-11-609, UT ST§ 49-11-609 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Dornmcnl 
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ADDENDUMD 
§ 49-11-610. Benefits payable in name of beneficiary--Delivery, UT ST§ 49-11-61 O 
!West's Utah Code Annotated 
fTitle 49. Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act (Refs & Annos) 
I Chapter 11. Utah State Retirement Systems Administration 
!Part 6. Procedures and Records 
U.C.A. 1953 § 49-11-610 
§ 49-11-610. Benefits payable in name of beneficiary--Delivery 
Currentness 
(l)(a) Any benefits payable to a beneficiary shall be made in the name of and delivered to the beneficiary or the lawfully 
appointed guardian or conservator of the beneficiary, or delivered as otherwise ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction 
under Title 75, Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
(b) If the benefit involves a payment not to exceed an amount authorized by the Utah Uniform Probate Code to any one 
beneficiary, the office may, without the appointment of a guardian or conservator or the giving of a bond, pay the amount 
due to the beneficiary or to the persons assuming their support. 
( c) The payment shall be in either a lump sum or in monthly amounts. 
( d) The total of the payments made under this section shall fully discharge and release the office from any further claims. 
(2) A beneficiary who qualifies for a monthly benefit under this section shall apply in writing to the office. 
(3) The allowance shall begin on the first day of the month following the month in which the: 
(a) member or participant died, if the application is received by the office within 90 days of the date of death of the 
member or participant; or 
(b) application is received by the office, if the application is received by the office more than 90 days after the date of 
Gill) death of the member or participant. 
WESTLAW 
Credits 
Laws 1987, c. 1, § 26; Laws 1997, c. 31, § 4, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 2002, c. 250, § 33, eff. March 26, 2002; Laws 2014, c. 
15, § 6, eff. March 3, 2014. 
Codifications C. 1953, § 49-1-607. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 49-11-610, UT ST§ 49-11-610 
Current through 2015 First Special Session 
End of Document ,£) 2016 Thomson Rt!uters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
WESTLAW @20·16 Thornson Reuters. No cla1rn IO original U.S. Governr11ant Works. 2 
ADDENDUME 
Ci 
DIANE WELTY 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CASE HISTORY 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No: 120902041 MP 
MARY ELLEN LOPEZ Judge: RICHARD MCKELVIE 
Defendant. Date: Dec. 08, 2014 
CASE DISPOSITION 
09/19/2012 Dismissed by Judge RICHARD MCKELVIE 
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